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IN SEARCH OF A COMPROMISED SOLUTION TO
THE PROBLEM ARISING FROM PATENTING
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOLS
Natalie M. Derzkot
Patents are acknowledged to be of central importance in the area
of biomedical research and development.'
At the same time,
however, many commentators have expressed concern about there
being too much patenting in this area, particularly in the area of
biomedical research tools.2 The concern of these critics is that patents
on research tools may block future biomedical research and
development.3 This paper argues that, while patenting of such tools is
desirable and thus should not be obliterated, some legal limitations on
the ability of patent owners to enforce their biomedical research tool
patents should exist. That is, certain users and uses of research tools
should be exempted from patent infringement and limits should be
imposed on amounts and types of royalties that a patent owner can
collect from their research tool patents.
Part I of this paper is devoted to defining the term 'biomedical
research tool" and what it encompasses, as well as exploring how
such tools might be used. In Part II, we develop an understanding of
the problem associated with the patenting of biomedical research
tools. In this context, we trace what essentially is the demise of the
common law experimental use exception, and how this development
has contributed to the urgency of the research tools problem. Part III
considers the link between the statutory experimental use exception
pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and biomedical research tools.
Section 271(e)(1) originally was intended to benefit generic
t J.S.D. Candidate, Julius Silver Fellow in Law, Science and Technology, Columbia
Law School; M.S. Biotechnology, Johns Hopkins University, 2001; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1995; LL.B., Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 1993; B.Sc. Human Biology,
University of Toronto, 1991. Special thanks to Professors Harold Edgar, Richard Nelson and
William Sage for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. This article has been
written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law
in the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
1. See infra note 159.
2. See, e.g., infra note 21.
3. Id.
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pharmaceutical companies who manufacture "copycat" drugs based
on original, patented drugs. That is, this exception was intended to
give these companies a safe harbor from infringing the original drug's
patent while they conducted the necessary experiments to obtain FDA
approval on their copycat drug. 4 However, both U.S. courts and the
many players in the biomedical research community have interpreted
the provision much more broadly. Recently, Judge Rader deviated
sharply from this broad interpretive approach in Integra Lifesciences
1, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 5 when he found that the experimental use
exception in § 271(e)(1) cannot be extended to render non-infringing
a company's otherwise infringing use of a patented research tool.
Part III explores the effects of this decision on the patent problem
relating to biomedical research tool patents. Finally, Part IV proposes
a solution for addressing the problem arising from patents on
biomedical research tools.
I.

WHAT ARE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOLS AND How MIGHT
THEY BE USED

There are a broad range of materials that might be termed
"research tools" because they can be used in the course of biomedical
or biotechnological research. For example, research tools might
include biochemicals, such as reagents, plasmids, antibodies and
enzymes that are used to develop and test subsequent pharmaceutical
end products.6 Generally speaking, these products are used to test the
efficacy or functionality of a pharmaceutical end product in a preclinical setting. It is conceivable that such research tools might also
be used to produce or identify a pharmaceutical end product.
Normally, such research tools would not become part of the final
product, although it is possible that they may do so. Another type of
research tool is a device that can be used and reused during the course
of biomedical research, and often operates based on a particular
methodology. Devices that run the Polymerase Chain Reaction
(PCR), a technique widely used to amplify small amounts of DNA,
are an example. 7 Other examples of such devices are protein and

4. See infta note 71.
5. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Judge Rader wrote the majority opinion for a threejudge panel, while Judge Newman wrote a dissent.
6. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., DONALD VOET & JUDITH G. VOET, BIOCHEMISTRY 904-05 (2d ed. 1995).
PCR has been instrumental in revolutionizing biomedical research.
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DNA sequencing instruments, 8 and microarrays 9 which allow a
downstream researcher to study a great number of biological
interactions at the same time, and knockout mice which provide a
disease model. 10 As one can imagine, various combinations of
research tools may be used when a new drug is researched, developed
and tested.
In their report, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working
Group on Research Tools used:
the term "research tool" in its broadest sense to embrace the full
range of resources that scientists use in the laboratory, while
recognizing that from other perspectives the same resources may
be viewed as "end products."
For [the Working Group's]
purposes, the term [included] cell lines, monoclonal antibodies,
reagents, animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry
libraries, drugs and drug targets, clones and cloning tools (such as
PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and machines, databases and
computer software.... l

8. JUrgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A HistoricalPerspective, 287 SCIENCE 1960, 1962
(2000).
9. Affymetrix is one company that manufactures microarrays. At their website,
http://www.affymetrix.com/technology/techprobe-content.html (last visited March 27, 2002),
Affymetrix describes one of its microarray technologies as follows: "GeneChip® technology
provides efficient access to genetic information using miniaturized, high-density arrays of
oligonucleotide probes." Furthermore, they describe how their GeneChip® microarray works:
Once fabricated, the GeneChip® probe arrays are ready for hybridization. The
nucleic acid to be analyzed (the target) is isolated, amplified and labeled with a
fluorescent reporter group. The labeled target is then incubated with the array
and stained with fluorescent dye using the fluidics station and hybridization oven.
After the hybridization reaction is complete, the array is inserted into the scanner,
where patterns of hybridization are detected. The hybridization data are collected
as light emitted from the fluorescent reporter groups already incorporated into the
target, which is now bound to the probe array. Probes that most clearly match the
target generally produce stronger signals than those that have mismatches. Since
the sequences and position of each probe on the arrray are known, by
complementarity, the identity of the target nucleic acid applied to the probe array
can be determined.
10. For example,
[t]he OncoMouse® transgenic animal technology relates to animal models that
develop tumors as a consequence of containing recombinant activated oncogene
sequences. First described by Dr. Philip Leder, its usefulness in basic medical
research is widely recognized as these mice are key model systems for the study
of cancer and in testing the effectiveness of novel cancer therapeutics.
Press Release, NIH and E.I. Dupont Sign OncoMouse®Agreement (Jan. 19, 2000), available at
http://www.nih.gov/news/pr/jan2000/od- 19.htm.
11.
National Institutes of Health, Report of the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
Working Group on Research Tools (June 4, 1998), at
http://www.nih.gov/news/researchtools/index.htm.
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Additionally, the NIH issued Guidelines 12 for recipients of NIH
research grants and contracts regarding the dissemination of
biomedical research tools. However, instead of the term "research
tools," the Guidelines use the term "biomedical research resources" or
"unique research resources," which the NIH defined as follows:
The term "unique research resource" is used in its broadest sense
to embrace the full range of tools that scientists use, in the
laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents,
animal models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA
libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods,
laboratory equipment and machines. The terms "research tools"
and "materials" are used ... interchangeably with "unique research
resources." Databases and materials subject to copyright, such as
software, are also research tools in many contexts. Although the
information provided here may be applicable to such resources, the
NIH recognizes that databases and software present unique
questions which [are not] fully explored in [the Guidelines]. 13
Therefore, the NIH Research Tools Working Group and the NIH
Research Tools Guidelines use a similar definition for research tools;
however, the Guidelines exclude databases and software from their
definition. Also notably omitted from the Guidelines are "drugs and
drug targets." No doubt, the inclusion of these two items in the NIH
Working Group's definition of research tools is controversial since
pharmaceutical companies see drugs and drug targets as being end
products whose successful sale is key to their existence.
The Working Group elaborated on this tension when it described
the difficulty of identifying something as a research tool, since what is
a research tool in a user's hands might be an end product in the
provider's hands:
The very term "research tool" connotes a user perspective rather
than a provider perspective. What a user sees as a research tool, a
provider may see as a valuable end product for sale to customers.
A striking example of this difference in perspective arises when a
scientist in a university wants to use a candidate pharmaceutical
compound in research. From the perspective of the university and
the scientist, the compound is a mere research tool, potentially
useful in making future discoveries. But from the perspective of
the firm, the compound may be a very precious end product, the
12. Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg.
72,090 (Dec. 23, 1999).
13. Id. at 72,092 n.1.
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payoff from significant investments of time and shareholder dollars
in its own research.
The label "research tool" may apply less equivocally to the
multitude of biological discoveries that precede the identification
of new therapeutic compounds, including DNA sequences,
databases, clones, cell lines, animal models, receptors and ligands
involved in disease pathways, or laboratory techniques used to
create or identify these discoveries. But even these "upstream"
discoveries might seem like commercial end products to the
institutions that discover them. Some of these materials might,
ultimately prove to be therapeutic or diagnostic products in their
own right, marketable to consumers for use outside the laboratory.
Others might have, or appear to have, sufficient commercial value
as resources for use in the discovery of future products to motivate
some firms to invest in their identification and development for
sale or license to other firms for use in further research. What
counts as a research tool and what counts as an end product thus
varies from one institution to the next. Inevitably, each institution
minimizes the value of the discoveries it borrows from others,
14
while seeing great value in its own past and future discoveries.
In the private firm context, research tools might be used to
identify, develop, produce and test pharmaceutical end products for
which marketing approval may be sought from the Food and Drug
For example, as mentioned earlier,
Administration (FDA).
biochemicals, such as reagents, plasmids, antibodies and enzymes can
be used to develop and test subsequent pharmaceutical end products
(e.g., that might test the efficacy or functionality of a pharmaceutical
end product in a pre-clinical setting). Many of these types of research
tools can be purchased by a researcher from a company that is in the
business of selling such tools to laboratories. 1 5 However, it is also
conceivable that less readily available molecular targets, such as
antibodies and receptors that are proprietary and not widely
distributed, might also be used as research tools to produce or identify
a pharmaceutical end product. If such targets are owned by the
private firm doing the research, then there is no access problem.
However, if such targets are owned by a third party, the private firm
conducting the research may only be granted access under a license
that may have onerous terms, and this could be 'problematic. As one
can imagine, various combinations of research tools may be used
14. National Institutes of Health, supra note 11, at 5.
15. See, e.g., the products available from Invitrogen at http://www.invitrogen.com (last
visited Nov. 24, 2003).
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when a new drug is researched, developed and tested. Interestingly,
the tools used by private firms happen to be the same kinds of tools
that public sector entities (e.g., such as universities) would use to
conduct biomedical research.
Consequently, it seems only
appropriate to adopt one unified definition of "research tools" for all
types of users.
This is so even though the Working Group has indicated that
private firms find the term "research tool" to be problematic,
particularly when it is defined broadly:
From the perspective of private firms, the category "research tool"
is itself problematic. Many individuals that we spoke to asked at
the outset how we define research tools and took exception to a
broad definition that included things such as therapeutic
compounds that they regard as end products. Some people firther
noted that it is often hard to tell the difference between things that
are used only in the laboratory and things that might potentially be
sold to non-research consumers. For example, a DNA sequence
that is currently of use only to researchers ultimately may prove to
be a diagnostic marker or to encode a therapeutic protein.
Moreover, even something that is used exclusively by researchers
rather than by ordinary 16consumers may have considerable
competitive value to a firm.
While we must be mindful of private firms' concerns over broad
research tool definitions, it would be imprudent at this stage of the
analysis to exclude certain categories of patented inventions from the
category of "research tool" identified by the Working Group.
Consequently, in this paper, we adopt the Working Group's broad
definition of research tools for all users. However, these concerns
point to the fact that we should think of "research tools" under two
categories, namely, "pure research tools" and "partial research tools."
The term "pure research tools" would include tools that cannot be
used in any manner other than for research. If a research tool
provider is in the business of selling a research tool as a source of
income, then the tool will more readily fall within the category of
pure research tools. For example, research tools listed in a catalog
(e.g., such as enzymes, cell lines, antibodies, reagents) and that might
be sold to laboratories would fall under this category. Moreover, such
items would be considered pure research items even if one university
laboratory might have developed such a product non-commercially
and might, out of courtesy, be willing to transfer such a tool to a user
16.

National Institutes of Health, supra note 11, at 13.

2004]

PATENTING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOLS

353

who has requested a sample. The term "partial research tools," on the
other hand, might include those tools that can be used during the
course of research but also can be used in a non-research capacity,
such as a drug product. Such distinctions are worth keeping in mind
when identifying a possible solution to the patented research tools
problem. 17
In an era of ever-increasing patenting activity, the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) has issued an increasing number of
patents for inventions that might fall under the research tools
category. Certainly, not all research tools are patentable. Only those
tools that the PTO finds are new, useful and non-obvious and that are
properly disclosed in the patent application can be protected. 8 In the
next part of this paper, we will explore what concerns people have
raised as to biomedical research tool patents. In the interim, we will
build on the Working Group's comments about research tools and
will systematically consider who are the providers and users of
patented research tools and what types of uses each of these groups
wishes to make of those research tools. The idea here is to create a
relatively simple model of research activities involving the use of
patented biomedical research tools so that we may better understand
the problems that commentators have raised as to research tool
patents, and to better evaluate possible solutions to those problems.
The chart that follows describes this model, and provides a
framework for the analysis in this article. This model will be referred
to subsequently by reference to the alphanumerical designations used
in this chart.
PATENTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOL ACTIVITYUSER/PRO VIDER MODEL
A. There are three types of research tool patent holders that
might provide research tools to members of the public ("the
providers"):
17. See infra part IV.
18.
While not directly the subject of this article, some commentators argue that certain
patents on research tools should not have been granted because such patents seek to patent what
those commentators believe are naturally-occurring things, or should not have been allowed on
such broad terms and based only on a research utility, and that this inappropriate patenting is
exacerbating the research tools problem discussed, infra, Part 11. See, e.g., Richard Nelson, The
Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons (Aug. 11, 2003) RES. POL'Y (manuscript

accepted for publication and on file with the author). The assumption made in this article is that
the research tool patents being considered have been properly issued by the PTO under U.S.
patent law. If this is not the case then such patents should be invalidated. The reader, however,
should be aware of this line of debate.
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1. Entities in the private sector-for example, companies,
and other profit-maximizing industry actors;
2. Entities in the public sector-for example, universities
and research institutions, whether sponsored by
government-procured public funds or private endowment;
and
3. Individuals.
B. There are two types of uses that the providers might make of
their research tool patents.
1. Refusal to License: First, a provider may obtain a patent
on a research tool but then refuse to licence it to any users
because the provider sees a competitive advantage to
being the exclusive user of the research tool without
competition from someone else. One would expect that
only a provider in the private sector might take this
position. In fact, it seems inappropriate for a provider in
the public sector, such as a university, to refuse to make a
research tool available-even pursuant to a license,
because a core academic value that all universities share
is the dissemination of knowledge and to encourage
scientific discovery.
2. Licensing: Second, a provider may wish to make money
from its patented research tool through a licensing
program. Each of the three types of providers noted
above could engage in this type of use of the research
tool, If a private sector entity does this then one might
consider it to be in the business of selling research tools.
C. There are three types of users amongst members of the public
that might wish to use patented research tools ("the users"):
1. Entities in the private sector-i.e., companies, and other
profit-maximizing industry actors;
2. Entities in the public sector-i.e., universities and
research institutions, whether sponsored by governmentprocured public funds or private endowment; and
3. Individuals.
D. There are four types of uses that the users might wish to
make of patented research tools.
1. New Product Development: First, a user might use a
research tool in the course of research in order to develop
a new product. Generally, this is a use that a private
sector entity would most likely be involved in.
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2.

Design-Around Development: Second, a user might use a
research tool to try to develop a commercially-viable
design-around for it (i.e., a better or at least an alternative
research tool). This is generally but not exclusively
something that a private sector entity might do.
3. Research on the Tool Itself: Third, a user may wish to
study the research tool itself, simply to better understand
how it works but may have no interest in developing a
commercially-viable design-around for it.
A public
sector entity is most likely to engage in this type of
activity.
4. Using the Tool to Conduct Basic Research: Fourth, a user
may just engage in a course of basic research that requires
the use of a research tool. It is most likely a public sector
entity that might want to use a research tool in this
manner.
Although the model outlined above as to research tool patent
providers and users is quite general, it will prove helpful in
subsequent parts of this paper, as we explore the scope of the research
tools problem, and possible ways to solve it. However, given that the
concept of a research tool denotes a user perspective,' 9 the focus in
the forthcoming analysis will be on parts C and D of the model,
namely the users of research tools and their potential uses of such
tools. One nuance of the model that we will consider later is the
situation where the public sector user acts in a commercially-driven
manner. This phenomenon will factor into our analysis of a possible
solution to the research tools patenting problem.
II. WHAT ARE

THE CONCERNS THAT EXIST As TO BIOMEDICAL

RESEARCH TOOL PATENTS?

Improved biomedical research tools facilitate research and
development activities, and often make such research more predictive
and efficient, even though there are costs associated with using such
tools, particularly if the tools are patented and a user needs to obtain a
license to use them. These costs must get factored into the overall
cost of doing research. In recent years, commentators, such as
Rebecca Eisenberg, have voiced increasing concern about the costs to
society of patented research tools, and have written various articles on

19.

National Institutes of Health, supra note II and accompanying text.

356

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 20

this point. 20 Eisenberg wrote one such article with Michael Heller in
which the Abstract of the article described their message as follows:
The "tragedy of the commons" metaphor helps explain why people
overuse shared resources. However, the recent proliferation of
intellectual property rights in biomedical research suggests a
different tragedy, an "anticommons" in which people underuse
scarce resources because too many owners can block each other.
Privatization of biomedical research must be more carefully
deployed to sustain both upstream research and downstream
product development. Otherwise, more intellectual property rights
may lead paradoxically to fewer useful products for improving
human health.2 '
The research tools problem generated so much interest in the legal
and scientific communities that the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) established the Working Group referred to earlier "to look into
problems encountered in the dissemination and use of proprietary
research tools, the competing interests of intellectual property owners
and research users underlying these problems, and possible NIH
responses. 22 Additionally, a workshop was held on the topic at the
National Academy of Sciences.2 3
Eisenberg
and Heller mention
several examples
of
"anticommons" that can arise in the context of biomedical research.
First, they cite the notorious patent applications on expressed
sequence tags (ESTs) that were filed by the NIH in 199124 as well as

20.
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Technology Transfer and the Genome Project:
Problems with PatentingResearch Tools, 5 RISK 163 (1994).
21.
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Abstract, Can Patents DeterInnovation?
The Anticommons in BiomedicalResearch,280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998).
22.
See National Institutes of Health, supra note 11, as well as accompanying text; see
also Principles and Guidelines for Research Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts
on Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources, supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
23.
See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY: SUMMARY OF A WORKSHOP HELD AT THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,
FEBRUARY
15-16,
1996 (National
Research Council
ed.,
1997),
available at
http://books.nap.edu/books/0309057485/html/index.html
[hereinafter
RESEARCH
TOOLS
WORKSHOP SUMMARY].
24. In the RESEARCH TOOLS WORKSHOP SUMMARY, supra note 23, these events are
described in more detail as follows:
An expressed-sequence tag (EST) is part of a sequence from a cDNA clone that
corresponds to an mRNA (Adams and others 1991).... In 1991 and 1992, NIH
filed patent applications for 6,800 ESTs and for the rapid sequencing method
developed by Craig Venter, who was a scientist at NIH. The PTO rejected NIH's
application and when Harold Varmus became director of NIH, he decided not to
appeal. But controversy caused by the initial patent application continued. In
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similar types of applications filed by private firms since that time.25
Second, they point out the more recent reach-through license
agreements (RTLAs) that have been sought for using some patented
research tools, such as, the patented OncoMouse® owned by DuPont
Corporation.26 The former scenario is said to be an example of

"creating too many concurrent fragments of intellectual property
rights in potential future products," whereas the latter scenario is said
to be an example of "permitting too many upstream patent owners to
stack licenses on top of the future discoveries of downstream users. 27
Eisenberg and Heller describe RTLAs as follows:
[A]n RTLA gives the owner of a patented invention, used in
upstream stages of research, rights in subsequent downstream
discoveries. Such rights may take the form of a royalty on sales
that result from use of the upstream research tool, an exclusive or
nonexclusive license on future discoveries, or an option to acquire
such a license. In principle, RTLAs offer advantages to both
patent holders and researchers. They permit researchers with
limited funds to use patented research tools right away and defer
payment until the research yields valuable results. Patent holders
may also prefer a chance at larger payoffs from sales of
downstream products rather than certain, but smaller, upfront fees.
1992, Venter left NIH to form The Institute for Genome Research (TIGR), a
nonprofit company, and William Haseltine joined the newly established private
company, Human Genome Sciences (HGS), a for-profit company that initially
provided almost all of TIGR's funding. The focus of the controversy then moved
from the public to the private sector, and it changed from an issue about patenting
research tools to an issue of access to unpatented research tools. Like many other
research tools, ESTs fill different roles and some of the controversy has involved
disputes of the relative importance of ESTs for uses other than research. Id. at 51.
As is discussed below, infra note 160, prevention in the form of a robust patent examining
system is the best "solution" for the "anticommons" that might be created as a result of
excessive patenting on upstream discoveries, such as ESTs. For example, the statutory
requirements that a patent only be granted pertaining to inventions that are new, useful, nonobvious and properly described and enabled, help prevent an "anticommons" from being created
in any technological area. See infra note 160.
25. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 699.
26. Id. Since Heller and Eisenberg's seminal paper, supra note 21, the NIH and DuPont
have signed an agreement based on terms set forth in a Memorandum of Understanding
("MOU") dated January 18, 2000. Pursuant to the MOU, "DuPont will continue to provide, at
no cost, the OncoMouse® transgenic animal technology to academic laboratories for research
uses and will allow unencumbered use and transfer of this technology among researchers at notfor-profit institutions. The MOU imposes no limitations on scientific publications or so-called
'reach-through' rights". See Press Release, supra note 10. See also the MOU available at
http://ott.od.nih.gov/textonly/oncomouse.htm (last visited Aug. 16, 2003). Therefore, although
NIH researchers and NIH grantees are not subject to RTLAs on the OncoMouse®, other groups
of researchers may still be burdened by the RTLAs imposed by DuPont on this research tool.
27. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 699.
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In practice, RTLAs may lead to an anticommons as upstream
owners stack overlapping and inconsistent claims on potential
downstream products. In effect, the use of RTLAs gives each
upstream patent owner a continuing right to be present at the
bargaining table
as a research project moves downstream toward
28
development.
Interestingly, Cetus Corporation initially proposed RTLAs on any
products developed using PCR. 29 However, this scheme was resisted
by downstream users of the technology. 30 Since that time, HoffmanLaRoche has acquired rights to PCR technology, and has offered
licenses to use the technology without reach-through obligations.
These licenses are initially more expensive but do not have any
"strings attached. 3 1
Given the costs of purchasing and licensing research tools, it is
very likely that researchers and research entities would welcome a
reduction in the costs of using research tools. The NIH Working
Group on Research Tools, for example, found that: "virtually every
firm that [they] spoke with believed that restricted access to research
tools is impeding the rapid advance of research and that the problem
is getting worse., 32 Consequently, many people likely agree with
Eisenberg and Heller that there is a problem with the increasing
number of patents issued to research tools, and would be pleased to
find a solution to the problem.
One way to make research tools more readily available to some
researchers is to create a research exemption by which certain users of
research tools would be insulated from a charge of patent
infringement even though they have no license to use the tool. The
question is, how broad might such an exemption be? Some analysts
believe that a research exemption should exist for public sector
researchers and individuals conducting research on the tool itself to
better understand how the tool works and also should exist for these
same users when they engage in basic research with the tool. For
example, Stephen Maebius and Harold Wegner have argued that
"[u]niversity research uniquely needs a research exemption from

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
National Institutes of Health, supra note 11.
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patent infringement to carry out its functions." 33 Such commentators
would like to see such an exemption for the use of patented inventions
generally and not only for biomedical research tool patents. Of
course, many research tool providers (and at least private entity
providers) likely would argue that it is irrelevant whether a public or
private user is making use of a research tool for basic science research
or drug development, since, if their tool is being used, then they
should be compensated.34
To better appreciate the scope of such a research exemption, it is
helpful to look to the model introduced previously which enumerated
various types of research tool patent users (i.e., Cl, C2 or C3) and
various types of uses that a user might wish to make of a patented
research tool (i.e., Dl, D2, D3 or D4), and to create a matrix that
shows the circumstances in which the research exemption might be
available for a certain user engaging the research tool in a certain use.
Such a matrix might look as follows:
Cl (private

C2 (public

C3 (individuals)

sector)
No - exception

sector)
No - exception

No - exception

development)

should not be
available

should not be
available

should not be
available

D2(designaround

No - exception
should not be

No - exception
should not be

No - exception
should not be

development)

available

available

available

D3(research on

N/A - all

Yes - exception

Yes - exception

tool itself)

activities likely
business

should be
available

should be
available

oriented
N/A - all

Yes - exception

Yes - exception

activities likely
business

should be
available

should be
available

D l (new product

D4(tool in basic

research)

oriented

33.

Stephen B. Maebius & Harold C. Wegner, The Looming Crisis Over the Research

Use Exception to Patent Infringement: What Madey Taught Duke University, FINDLAW FOR
LEGAL PROFESSIONALS, available at

http://library.lp.findlaw.com/articles/file/00156/008583/title/Subject/topic/Education%2OLawC
olleges/Universities/filename/educationlaw 1_145 (last visited June 28, 2003).
34. Anecdotal evidence as obtained from speaking with licensing negotiators of the
University of Virginia, based on the extensive number of licensing requests made recently, post
the Madey v. Duke Univ. decision discussed later. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
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The matrix reflects a series of value judgments in which
commercial activities involving research tools would not be insulated
from a patent infringement charge by a research exemption, but noncommercial activities involving research tools would be so protected.
That is, all users engaging in new product development or designaround development with the tool (i.e., commercially-driven
activities) would not be protected by such a research exemption.
Moreover, the matrix reflects the view that it is unlikely that a private
sector researcher could be said to engage in non-commercially driven
research akin to public-sector research, since private-sector research
is, by nature, commercial. This limited research exemption would not
provide a complete solution to the research tools problem, since there
are numerous legitimate research activities, albeit commercial in
nature, that would remain exposed to research tool patents.35
Other commentators, such as Professor Janice Mueller, discuss
an even broader research exemption that would extend into more
commercial uses of patented inventions, and particularly of patented
biomedical research tools.
The public policies promoted by choosing to exempt
"philosophical" research from liability while denying the benefits
of the exemption to innovation having the slightest "commercial"
flavor are suspect. Society benefits from new therapeutic and
diagnostic products, whether or not they arose from a profit
motive. Arguably, society may benefit more when profit motive
drives innovation. This is because industry funding of university
research tends to focus on short-term projects leading to
marketable products rather than longer-term basic research. Thus,
the "anti-commercialism" element of the experimental use doctrine
as currently interpreted actually works against the prompt
introduction of new drugs and therapies into the market place.
Profit motive should no longer be held antithetical to the
experimental use doctrine.
A re-conceptualization of the
experimental use doctrine must consider the commercial realities
of the twenty-first century research and development process. The
involvement of a for-profit firm in the use of patented research
tools to develop new products should not be treated
as per se
36
outside the scope of the experimental use doctrine.
35.
For example, in the chart, the research activities designated in the following boxes
would remain exposed: CI-DI, Cl-D2, CI-D3, CI-D4, C2-D1, C2-D2, C3-DI, and C3-D2. See
also infra note 36 and accompanying text.
36. Janice M. Mueller, No 'Dilettante Affair': Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception
to PatentInfringementfor Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (2001).
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A matrix like the one provided above illustrating this broader
viewpoint would, it seems, have every square marked as "yesexception should be available." On a positive note, if this breadth of
coverage were available in a general research exemption, then the
research tools problem would not exist since all conceivable uses with
a research tool would be exempt from patent infringement. Thus,
research tools could be used freely. However, at the same time,
patent protection for research tools would be effectively obliterated
since research tool patents would not be enforceable against any
users. Mueller acknowledges this fact and thus ultimately proposes a
different approach discussed later.3 7 Consequently, although society
benefits tremendously from profit-driven research and perhaps
benefits more from this type of research than from other research,
such a broad notion of a research exemption is untenable. A more
balanced view of such an exemption is the one advocated, for
example, by Wegner and Maebius and discussed above. Such a view
is fair since those companies engaging in commercial research should
have the financial means to compensate research tool patent providers
for the use of their tools, within reasonable parameters.
At one time, "it had been unquestioned that an experimental use
exemption exists for purely scientific research to study and
understand a patented invention, including [its] limited use to make
new innovations that may or may not be outside the scope of the
original patent." 38 These times no longer exist, as discussed below.
Rather than at least offering a partial solution to the research tools
problem by making, for example, a research exemption available to
public sector researchers for non-commercial research, recent
developments in patent law have only exacerbated the "anticommons"
of research tools by making such a research exemption essentially
unavailable, even to university or public sector researchers. The
issues of a non-statutory experimental use exception and a de minimis
exception to patent infringement recently were considered in Embrex
4°

39
Inc. v. Service EngineeringCorp., and Madey v. Duke University

The historical roots for the common law experimental use
exception lie in a 19th century opinion by Justice Story in Whittemore

37. See id. at 39, 41. Mueller's ultimate approach is discussed infra note 167 and at the
end of Part IV, and would allow for "non-consensual 'development use' of such tools... [but] in
exchange for an ex post royalty payment." Id. at 4 1.
38. Maebius & Wegner, supranote 33, at 1.
39. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
40. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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v. Cutter.4 ' While justifying a jury instruction given by a trial judge
in a case involving patent infringement issues, Justice Story stated
that "it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish
a man who constructed such a machine merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the
machine to produce its described effects. 42 A few decades later, the
law became "well-settled that an experiment with a patented article
for the sole purpose of gratifying a philosophical taste, or curiosity, or
for mere amusement is not an infringement of the rights of the
patentee., 43 Its scope also was described in the leading nineteenth
century Patents treatise as follows:
An unauthorized sale of the invention is always [an infringing act].
But the manufacture or the use of the invention may be intended
only for other purposes, and produce no pecuniary result. Thus
where it is made or used as an experiment, whether for the
gratification of scientific tastes, or for curiosity, or for amusement,
the interests of the patentee are not antagonized, the sole effect
being of an intellectual character in the promotion of the
employer's knowledge or the relaxation afforded to his mind. But
if the products of the experiment are sold, or used for the
convenience of the experimentor, or if the experiments are
conducted with a view to the adaptation of the invention to the
experimentor's business, the acts of making or of use are violations
44
of the rights of the inventor and infringements of his patent.
More recently, the Federal Circuit held, in Roche Products., Inc.
v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo.,45 that the common law experimental use
exception was narrow and did not extend to experimental uses of a
patented invention in the commercial sphere.46 More specifically, the
exception did not permit a generic company to carry out experimental
activities with a patented drug that were necessary to obtain
marketing approval.4 7 Writing for the Federal Circuit, Judge Nichols

41.

29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).

Apparently, "Justice Story

sought to justify a trial judge's instruction to a jury that an infringer must have an intent to use a
patented invention for profit." Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 862 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
42.

Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.

43.
Peppenhausen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1861) (No. 11,279). See also
Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 862.
44.

William C. Robinson, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 898 (1890).

45.

733 F.2d at 858.

46.

Id. at 863.

47.

Id.
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offered the following comments about the common law experimental
use exception:
Bolar's intended "experimental" use is solely for business reasons
and not for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry. Bolar's intended use of flurazepam hcl [sic]
to derive FDA required test data is thus an infringement of the '053
patent. Bolar may intend to perform "experiments," but unlicensed
experiments conducted with a view to the adaption of the patented
invention to the experimentor's business is a violation of the rights
of the patentee to exclude others from using his patented invention.
It is obvious here that it is a misnomer to call the intended use de
minimis. It is no trifle in its economic effect on the parties even if
the quantity used is small. It is no dilettante affair such as Justice
Story envisioned. We cannot construe the experimental use rule so
broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the guise of
"scientific inquiry," when that inquiry has definite, cognizable, and
48
not insubstantial commercial purposes.
Knowing the background of the common law experimental use
exception, we can now return to the twenty-first century, and consider
the Embrex and Madey cases. In Embrex, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding of infringement where a
defendant performed scientific experiments to improve (i.e., design
around) a patent claiming a method for inoculating birds against
disease by injecting vaccines into the egg before hatching. 49 The
Court found that the doctors' tests could not be deemed experimental
use or de minimis since the tests were "expressly for commercial
purposes." 50 In a concurrence, Judge Rader explained that "the Patent
Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses
for infringement.",51 As to the de minimis defense, Judge Rader noted
that "[d]amages for an extremely small infringing use may be de
minimis, but infringement is not a question of degree. 52
Furthermore, as to experimental use, he noted that "neither the statute
nor any past Supreme Court precedent gives any reason to excuse
infringement because it was committed with a particular purpose or
53
intent, such as for scientific experimentation or idle curiosity."
Judge Rader's disdain for broad exceptions to patent infringement has
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng'g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
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recently reappeared in the Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
KGaA54 decision, as we will see later.55
To those seeking an expansive general research exemption, the
Embrex case was discouraging since it signaled that commerciallydriven design-around activities (e.g., such as those in the private
sector, and referenced in the Cl-D2 cross-section of the matrix
provided above) 56 were not shielded from a finding of infringement
under the common law experimental use exception. However, until
recently, most observers expected that the common law experimental
use exception should at least be operable in the public sector research
context. However, the hopes of these observers were crushed when
the Federal Circuit held in Madey v. Duke University57 that the
common law experimental use exception is exceedingly narrow and
would not even extend to many (if not most) public sector research
activities.
In Madey, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding
that Duke used a former professor's patented equipment for
experimental purposes only and thus did not infringe his patents. 58
Judge Gajarsa reasoned that Duke, like other major research
universities, funds research projects with no commercial application
whatsoever; however, such projects "unmistakably further the
institution's legitimate business objectives, including educating and
enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects." 59
The Court then remanded the case to the district court to reconsider its
decision in light of a significantly limited experimental use exception,
holding:
In short, regardless of whether a particular institution or entity is
engaged in an endeavor for commercial gain, so long as the act is
in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business and is
not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly
philosophical inquiry, the act does not qualify for the very narrow
and strictly limited experimental use defense. Moreover,
the profit
60
or non-profit status of the user is not determinative.

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
See infra discussion of this case in Part III.
See matrix in earlier discussion of Part II.
307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 1362.
Id.
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Although Judge Gajarsa in Madey did not go so far as to state that the
experimental use exception does not exist, the Federal Circuit has
made the exception so narrow that it seems only a garage tinkerer's
(i.e., an individual's) use of a patented invention might be protected
by the exception.
Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit's ruling has led to profound
discontent amongst universities and other public sector research
entities. 6' Duke University appealed to the Supreme Court. Further,
various parties, including the United States government and an
association of universities whose faculties engage in scientific
research, filed amicus curiae briefs.62 The U.S. government took the
position that the petition for certiorari should be denied because: (1)
the Madey v. Duke University decision does not conflict with prior
precedent; (2) the case stemmed from an interlocutory decision such
that lower courts will be able to further explore the underlying facts in
the case and then better develop the scope of the experimental use
exception; and (3) the policy concerns addressed by Duke may be
better resolved through the legislative process. 63 In their amici curiae
brief, the association of universities wrote that "[b]y effectively
eliminating the exemption for even noncommercial academic
scientific research, the decision erects a significant roadblock to the
advancement of science," and that, as such, "[t]he amici curiae are
deeply disturbed by this ruling." 64 Moreover, the association pointed
out that: "The decision below threatens to stifle [university research
that has been crucial to scientific progress] and thereby endanger this
A
nation's continued leadership in science and technology. 6 5
particular concern of the universities was that they will need to
expend considerable resources to pay for additional patent searches
and infringement opinions. Additionally, they would have to engage
in more licensing agreements and participate in more litigation, as a

61.
See infra note 64 and accompanying text. See also anecdotal evidence discussed
supranote 34.
62.
See Duke University v. Madey, No. 02-1007 (Jan. 2, 2003) (petition for writ of
certiorari filed), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/02-1007.htm (last visited

June 28, 2003).
63.
Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 1, Duke Univ. v. Madey, 307 F.3d 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003) (No. 02-1007).
Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Medical Colleges, et al. at 3-4,
64.
Duke Univ. v. Madey, 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2639 (2003) (No.
02-1007). The brief, in support of Petitioner, was filed in the Supreme Court of the United States
on Jan. 29, 2003, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/02- 1007.htm.
65.

Association of American Medical Colleges' Brief, supra note 64, at 3-4.
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result of the decision.66
Yet, despite the alarming potential
consequences of the Madey decision to future scientific progress as
identified by universities, the Supreme Court denied review of this
case. 6 7 The Court, it appears, was more convinced by the arguments
made by Madey and the U.S. government than those made by Duke
and the association of universities.
Therefore, the common law research exemption has been
disemboweled and universities are left with having to turn to the
legislators to clean up the mess. In the meantime, the research tools
problem described by Eisenberg and Heller cannot be resolved either
partially or fully by the common law experimental use exception.

III. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTORY EXPERIMENTAL USE
EXCEPTION IN 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)(1) AND CAN IT SOLVE THE
RESEARCH TOOLS PROBLEM?

The statutory experimental use exception found at 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(1) was introduced by the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, more colloquially known as the HatchWaxman Act, to statutorily overturn the Federal Circuit's decision in
Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar PharmaceuticalCo. 68 As suggested
previously, in that decision, the Federal Circuit ruled that the common
law experimental use doctrine was not broad enough to shield a
generic pharmaceutical company's experimentation with a patented
invention from a finding of patent infringement, even though the
experimentation was undertaken to obtain the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA's) approval for a generic copy of the patented
drug. Section 271(e)(1) states as follows:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or
sell within the United States or import into the United States a
patented invention. . . solely for uses reasonably related to the
development and submission of information under a Federal law
which regulates the 69
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary
biological products.

By introducing § 271(e)(1), the legislators wanted to allow
generic pharmaceutical companies to undertake those activities found

66.
67.
2639.
68.
69.

Id. at 3.
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. at
733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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to be infringing in Roche v. Bolar without liability.7 ° However, since
its inception, this statutory experimental use exception has been
interpreted broadly by U.S. courts. 71 This broad interpretation has
given companies seeking to make "copycat drugs" or, more generally,
seeking to use a patented invention to make their own generic drug
product, a complete endorsement to engage in almost any and all
preparatory commercial and testing activities that might be necessary
to be able to enter into competition with the innovative, patent72
holding companies promptly after expiry of the relevant patent.
In view of the broad interpretation afforded to the experimental
use exception up until now, the increasingly vocal concerns of certain
commentators about patenting research tools, and the exceedingly
narrow scope of the common law experimental use exception, it
should come as no surprise that various partieg have recently tried to
convince the courts that the statutory experimental use exception
should encompass the free use of research tools in certain instances.
We will explore these cases in a moment, once we analyze the
wording of § 271(e)(1).
Although, as discussed above, the intention of § 271(e)(1) was to
allow generic companies to use a patented invention to conduct the
preparatory experimental work required to get FDA approval to
market a drug, the wording of this provision is general enough to be
applied more broadly. On its face, this provision exempts from patent
infringement the unauthorized use of a patented invention, which
arguably could be a patented research tool, if the use of that research
tool is reasonably related to the development and submission of
information under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Since the
searching for, development and pre-clinical safety and efficacy testing
of drugs for FDA approval could well require the use of one or more
patented research tools, it is quite conceivable that § 271(e)(1) might
be interpreted to exempt such use of patented research tools.
In Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.,73 an important case in the
jurisprudential development of § 271(e)(1), Magistrate Judge Brazil

70. See discussion infra Part IIl; see also infra note 71.
71. For an in-depth discussion on this topic, see Natalie M. Derzko, A Local and
comparativeAnalysis of the Experimental Use Exception-Is Harmonization Appropriate?44
IDEA 1 (2003).
72. Id.
73. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir.1993) in an
unpublished disposition that is not to be employed or cited as precedent. This decision was cited
with approval by the Federal Circuit in TelectronicsPacing Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982
F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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established the following test to determine what activities might be
acceptable under § 271(e)(1):
[W]ould it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in
defendant's situation to believe that there was a decent prospect
that the "use" in question would contribute (relatively directly) to
the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be
relevant in the processes by which the FDA would decide whether
to approve the product?" 74
When Magistrate Brazil asked that question, he found that the
following activities of the defendant with Cadence, a generic copy of
a patented medical device, fell within the scope of the provision: the
manufacture of several hundred Cadences; sales of the Cadence to
U.S. hospitals; sales of the Cadence to international distributors;
testing of the Cadence, particularly in Germany; and demonstrations
of the Cadence at trade shows.
Although this case focused on the
allowable activities of a defendant manufacturing generic copies of a
patented invention, the judge's question also can be posed in the
context of the scenario that we are interested in here, namely, whether
a defendant's use of a patented research tool might be protected by §
271 (e)(1). It seems that the use of a patented research tool during the
research and development of a drug product could fairly be said to
contribute relatively directly to the generation of kinds of information
that is likely to be relevant in the processes by which the FDA would
decide whether to approve the product.
Consequently, by this
analysis, § 271(e)(1) should cover the use of research tools during the
drug discovery process, since much of the data generated during this
process is of interest to the FDA. In fact, generally speaking, the
activities of a defendant with research tools are more closely related
to the type of information of interest to the FDA than the activities of
the defendant at issue in the Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. case.
The FDA is interested in reviewing the information that forms
the basis of any and all claims that are made in a pharmaceutical's
labeling, known as the "package insert., 76 The FDA provides some
direction regarding the content of the labeling in 21 C.F.R. § 201.56. 77

74.

Intermedics, 775 F. Supp. at 1280.

75.
76.

Id. at 1282.
See, e.g., STEVEN E. LINBERG, EXPEDITING DRUG AND BIOLOGICs DEVELOPMENT: A

STRATEGIC APPROACH 53 (2d ed. 1999).

77. General Requirements on the Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drugs, 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2003):
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In particular, the package insert should contain a summary of the

essential scientific information needed for the safe and effective use
of the product.7 8 This would include pharmacological information,
some of which may well be generated from experiments requiring the
use of biomedical research tools.

Prescription drug labeling described in § 201.100(d) shall contain the information
in the format required by § 201.57 and shall meet the following general
requirements:
(a) The labeling shall contain a summary of the essential scientific information
needed for the safe and effective use of the drug.
(b) The labeling shall be informative and accurate and neither promotional in
tone nor false or misleading in any particular.
(c) The labeling shall be based whenever possible on data derived from human
experience. No implied claims or suggestions of drug use may be made if there is
inadequate evidence of safety or a lack of substantial evidence of effectiveness.
Conclusions based on animal data but necessary for safe and effective use of the
drug in humans shall be identified as such and included with human data in the
appropriate section of the labeling, headings for which are listed in paragraph (d)
of this section.
(d)(l) The labeling shall contain specific information required under § 201.57
under the following section headings and in the following order:
Description.
Clinical Pharmacology.
Indications and Usage.
Contraindications.
Warnings.
Precautions.
Adverse Reactions.
Drug Abuse and Dependence.
Overdosage.
Dosage and Administration.
How Supplied.
(2) The labeling may contain the following additional section headings if
appropriate and if in compliance with § 201.57 (7)and (in):
Animal Pharmacology and/or Animal Toxicology.
Clinical Studies.
References.
(3) The labeling may omit any section or subsection of the labeling format if
clearly inapplicable.
(4) The labeling may contain a "Product Title" section preceding the
"Description" section and containing only the information required by §
201.57(a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) and § 201.100(e). The information required by
Sec. 201.57(a)(1)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) shall appear in the "Description"section of
the labeling, whether or not it also appears in a "Product Title."
(e) The labeling shall contain the date of the most recent revision of the labeling,
identified as such, placed prominently immediately after the last section of the
labeling.
78. Id.
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The notion that § 271(e)(1) should be broadly interpreted is
supported by the Supreme Court's decision in Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Medtronic, Inc. 79 In that case, the Cour-t considered the meaning and

scope of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 80 In particular, the court considered
whether, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), activities which are
undertaken for the purpose of developing and submitting to the FDA
information necessary to obtain marketing approval for a medical
device under § 515 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act are
exempt from patent infringement. 8 1 Since § 271(e)(1) did not
specifically mention medical devices, Justice Scalia adopted a broad
reading of the provision in order to include medical devices within the
scope of the provision.
Yet, an argument also can be made that this Supreme Court
decision would not support interpreting § 271(e)(1) to exempt the use
of research tools during drug discovery. This was the view taken by
Judge Crabb of the Western District of Wisconsin in Infigen, Inc. v.
Advanced Cell Technology, Inc.,82 an early case in which a court
considered whether § 271(e)(1) might shield a defendant's use of a
research tool from a finding of infringement. Judge Crabb relied on
Justice Scalia's "perfect product fit" reasoning when
determining the
83
applicability of § 271(e)(1) to the facts before him.
In the Eli Lilly decision, Justice Scalia spoke of the "perfect
product fit" between § 271(e)(1) and § 156 dealing with patent term
extensions.84 Justice Scalia reasoned that, since medical devices, food
additives, color additives, new drugs, antibiotic drugs and human
biological products are all subject to premarket approval under
various provisions of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, and are all
also eligible for a patent term extension, they should also be subject to
the experimental use exception. 85 Justice Scalia contrasted these
products with new animal drugs and veterinary products which were
excluded from both provisions. 86 However, in a footnote to the
discussion, Justice Scalia also revealed the weakness of his "perfect
product fit" analysis on two fronts.87 In 1986, "new infant formula"
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

496 U.S. 661 (1990).
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 979-80 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
Id.
Eli Lilly, 496 U.S. at 672.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 672 n.6.
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became subject to a premarket approval requirement, thereby making
it fall within § 271(e)(1). However, it remained excluded from §
156.88 Furthermore, in 1988, animal drugs and veterinary 9biological
products were added to § 156 but deleted from § 271(e)(1).8
In the Infigen case, the defendants conceded that they used the
method of the plaintiffs '720 patent and the culture media covered by
the plaintiff s '822 patent.90 The '720 patent was directed to a process
for activating bovine oocytes (unfertilized eggs) for use in cloning,
whereas the '822 patent was directed to a culture medium. 91
However, the defendants argued, with little support, that their use of
the plainitff s patented method and culture media was not infringing
in view of the protection afforded by § 271(e)(1), since they used the
plaintiffs patented method and culture medium while working on the
initial stages of a product that would later require FDA approval if it
were commercially viable. 92 Judge Crabb was unconvinced, and
reasoned, based on Justice Scalia's analysis in the Eli Lilly case, that §
271(e)(1) applied only to those patents covering products that were
subject to a regulatory review period prior to their commercial
marketing. 93 Since none of the plaintiffs patents covered a drug
product, and no such patent was covered by § 156, the judge felt that
§ 271(e)(1) was not applicable.9 4 Given the identified weakness with
Justice Scalia's "perfect product fit" reasoning, Judge Crabb's
analysis seems superficial and so is not very persuasive. Yet, for our
purposes, the facts of the case and its outcome (namely that §
27 1(e)(1) was found not to exempt the use of patented research tools),
are worth noting. As we will see, subsequent cases have grappled
more directly with the question whether the use of a research tool in
FDA-related research might be shielded by § 271(e)(1).
For example, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer,
Inc.95 involved a summary judgment motion on patent infringement in
which the main issue before the Court was whether § 271(e)(1)
rendered non-infringing Bristol-Myers Squibb's (BMS's) use of

88.

Id.

89. Id. Now, however, a review of § 271 (e)(1) reveals that certain animal drugs and
veterinary biological products are included within the scope of § 271 (e)(1).
90.
Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 979 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
91.

Id. at 969.

92.

Id. at 980.

93.

Id.

94.
Id.
95.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 (RPP),
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19361 (S.D. N.Y. 2001).
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Rhone-Poulenc Rorer's (RPR's) patented intermediates in its research
and development program. Judge Patterson rejected the argument
relied upon by the Infigen Court that the term "patented invention" in
§ 271(e)(1) is restricted in scope based on the products covered by §
156.96 He pointed out that the Federal Circuit also declined to adopt
such reasoning in AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp.97 and Chartex

International PLC v. MD. Personal Products Corp.98 Thereafter,
applying the Intermedics test identified above, Judge Patterson held
that:
A rational jury could only conclude based on these undisputed
facts that it was reasonable, objectively, for a party in Bristol's
position to believe that there was a "decent prospect" that its use of
the RPR intermediates in Bristol's experiments "would contribute
(relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that
was likely to be relevant in the process by which the FDA would

96. Id. at *6-* 10 n.5.
97. Id. at *7-* 10. The Federal Circuit declined to strictly follow Justice Scalia's "perfect
product fit" analysis in AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997). At issue
in that case was a patented class II medical device and method used in sterilizing medical
instruments in plasma. Exitron was developing a plasma sterilizer of its own and hired MDT to
undertake certain testing on the device that was consistent with the type of testing that would
have to be undertaken to obtain FDA approval for a class II medical device. However, at the
time of the litigation, Exitron had not yet filed an FDA application or marketed the device.
Accordingly, AbTox, the plaintiff, alleged that the actual purpose of the testing was to interest
potential customers and induce MDT to purchase the rights to the device. Rader J., writing for
the panel, held that Exitron's activities were shielded by the experimental use exception since
the statute "does not look to the underlying purposes or attendant consequences of the
activity... as long as the use is reasonably related to FDA approval." Id. at 1030. One of the
issues that Judge Rader had to resolve in this case was whether the experimental use exception
should extend to class II medical devices. The dilemma arose because a strict reading of Justice
Scalia's opinion in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medironic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 674 (1990), suggests that
there has to be a "perfect product fit" between those products whose use can be subject to an
experimental use exception, and those for which a patent term can also be extended pursuant to
§ 156. Class I and II medical devices only need to undergo an abbreviated premarket approval
process, unlike class III medical devices which undergo a much more rigorous approval process.
Furthermore, unlike class III medical devices, class II medical devices are not eligible for patent
term extensions. Therefore, a "perfect product fit" approach would lead to the decision that
class II medical devices are not a "patented invention" pursuant to § 271(e)(1). Nonetheless,
Judge Rader decided that the court must adopt the Supreme Court's broader holding (rather than
the "perfect product fit" approach) since § 271(e)(1) was not expressly limited to class III
medical devices.
98. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19361, at *8-*10. In Chartex
International PLC v. MD. Personal Products Corp., 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20560 (Fed.
Cir.1993) (unpublished), the patent owner alleged that the defendant's female condom, which
was either a Class I or II medical device, was not within the scope of § 271 (e)(1) because neither
a Class I nor a Class II device is eligible for a patent extension under § 156. Id. at *5 n.2. The
Federal Circuit rejected this argument, noting that possible limitations from one section should
not be read into the other. Id.
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decide whether to approve the product." Intermedics, 775 F. Supp.
at 1280. Accordingly, Bristol's experiments with the RPR
patented intermediates are entitled to the exemption Congress
provided in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) as "solely for uses reasonably
related to the development and submission of information under a
Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs .... 99 (Footnotes omitted).
Consequently, Judge Patterson found that § 271 (e)(1) protected
BMS' experimental uses of RPR's patented intermediates:
(1) even where each such use does not directly result in an FDA
application being filed, so long as the use was made in order to
determine whether or not an application for approval would be
sought; and (2) even though each such use of the patented
intermediates may not directly yield information that could be
submitted to the FDA, but relates to a preliminary activity that may
facilitate or be useful00in generating information that could be
submitted to the FDA.
Given Judge Patterson's solid reasoning and reference to
precedent, one might have thought that the Federal Circuit would take
the same position when faced with the question whether § 271(e)(1)
exempts the use of a patented research tool from infringement if it is
used solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information to the FDA. However, this is not what
occurred. In line with the trend of narrowing the scope of exceptions
to patent infringement started with Embrex and Madey, the Federal
Circuit recently held in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KgaA,10 '

99.

100.

Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *19-*21.

Id. at *24. In taking this position, Judge Patterson was influenced by the U.S. District

Court of Massachusetts' reasoning in Amgen v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., that post hoc

analyses of the coverage of § 271 (e)(I) are not appropriate:
Amgen's post hoc analysis misses the mark. The Defendants are protected by the
statute if the production of the three batches of GA-EPO was objectively likely to

generate useful information, even if the results were later discarded or abandoned
for reasons unrelated to FDA approval. The exemption is not so ephemeral that it
will be lost as a result of conduct which post dates the making, using or selling of

the patented product.
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19361, at *22 (quoting Amgen v. Hoechst
Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 109 [D. Mass. 1998]).
101.

331 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed. Cir. 2003). This panel was comprised of Judges Rader and

Prost in the majority, and Judge Newman in dissent. At the time of writing, a clerk in the
Federal Circuit Clerk's Office reported telephonically that an amicus curiae had filed a Petition

for Rehearing of this case on July 28, 2003. However, the Federal Circuit had not yet ruled on
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that § 271(e)(l) cannot be so extended. In doing so, the court
affirmed the lower court's ruling as to § 271(e)(1). 10 2 However, the
majority did call into question the $15 million reasonable royalty
awarded by the jury since the factual record did not appear to support
such an award, and remanded the103case back to the district court for
further consideration of this issue.
The Integra v. Merck case involved five patents belonging to
Integra and its co-plaintiffs relating to a short tri-peptide segment of
fibronectin known as the "RGD peptide."'' 0 4 This peptide promotes
cell adhesion by interacting with 0tv3
3 receptors. Good cell adhesion is
important for wound healing, biocompatibility of prosthetic devices
and angiogenesis (i.e., new blood vessel growth). 10 5 A defendant
scientist, Dr. Cheresh, working at The Scripps Institute (also a
defendant), discovered that blocking 0v133 receptors inhibits
angiogenesis, and that inhibiting angiogenesis can be a way to halt
tumor growth as well as treat other conditions (e.g. diabetic
retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, and inflammatory bowel
disease). 10 6 Merck found Dr. Cheresh's work promising and
to investigate potential drug
consequently hired him and Scripps
07
targets involving this mechanism.1
Thereafter, several potential drug candidates were identified and
Merck and Scripps pursued further research under an agreement to
fund "the necessary experiments to satisfy the biological bases and
regulatory (FDA) requirements for the implementation of clinical
trials" 108 for such drug candidates. After discovering the existence of
this agreement, Integra offered a license to Merck since it believed
that Dr. Cheresh's angiogenesis research was a commercial endeavor
that infringed its patents. (In her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman
indicated that Dr. Cheresh had synthesized and studied cyclic RGD
peptides of various structures, which presumably were the subject of
Integra's patents.) 0 9 However, Merck refused such a license, taking
the position that its activities were protected by 35 U.S.C. § 271 (e)(1),
the Petition. See Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 35 and 40 for rules describing this
Petition process.
102. Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 868, 872.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 862.
105.

Id.

106.

Id. at 863.

107.

Id.

108.
109.

Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 863.
Id. at 873-74.
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as well as arguing that the Integra patents were invalid.11 0 The district
court held that the statutory experimental use exception did not
exempt Merck's activities, and found Merck liable for infringing
Integra's patents. 11
In the majority's analysis, Judge Rader first examined previous
court pronouncements and legislative reports describing § 271(e)(1)
as a limited exception allowing generic companies to conduct the
necessary testing, namely bioequivalency testing, to get drug approval
on a generic substitute drug. 1 2 For example, Judge Rader pointed to
Hoechst-Roussel Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Lehman" 3 in which the
Federal Circuit noted that "[s]ection 271(e) permits premarket
approval activity conducted for the sole purposes of sales after patent
expiration."' 1 4 Consequently, in these first paragraphs of the decision,
Judge Rader was essentially informing the reader of his view that §
271(e)(1) should be seen as a narrow exception, just like the common
law experimental use exception. He then characterized the issue
before the Court as follows:
This court has not considered the question arising in this case,
namely, whether the pre-clinical research conducted under the
Scripps-Merck agreement is exempt from liability for infringement
of Integra's patents under § 271(e)(1). The Scripps-Merck
experiments did not supply information for submission to the
United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA), but instead
identified the best drug candidate to subject to future clinical
testing under the FDA processes. Thus, this court must determine
whether the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor reaches back down the chain
of experimentation to embrace development and identification
of
115
new drugs that will, in turn, be subject to FDA approval.
Next, Judge Rader focused on the language of § 271(e)(1),
placing particular emphasis on the term "solely," which had
essentially been written out of the statute in previous court
decisions.116 He concluded that Merck's activities were not protected

110.

Id. at 863.

111.

Id.

112. Id. at 865-66.
113.
109 F.3d 756 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
114. Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 865 (quoting Hoechst-Roussel Pharms., Inc. v.
Lehman, 109 F.3d at 763).
115. Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 865-66.
116. See Derzko, supra note 71, particularly the discussion of the Federal Circuit's
decision in Telectronics PacingSystems, Inc, v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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by § 271(e)(1), because such activities were not sufficiently related to
the development and submission of information to the FDA:
The 1984 Act further specifies the subject of the reasonable
relationship test. The exemption covers uses "reasonably related to
the development and submission of information" to the FDA.
Thus, to qualify at all for the exemption, an otherwise infringing
activity must reasonably relate to the development and submission
of information for FDA's safety and effectiveness approval
processes. The focus of the entire exemption is the provision of
information to the FDA. Activities that do not directly produce
information for the FDA are already straining the relationship to
the central purpose of the safe harbor. The term "reasonably"
permits some activities that are not themselves the experiments
that produce FDA information to qualify as "solely for uses
reasonably related" to clinical tests for the FDA. Again, however,
the statutory language limits the reach of that relationship test.
In this case, the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical
testing to supply information to the FDA, but only general
biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical compounds.
The FDA has no interest in the hunt for drugs that may or may not
later undergo clinical testing for FDA approval. For instance, the
FDA does not require information about drugs other than the
compound featured in an Investigational New Drug application.
Thus, the Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not "solely for
117
uses reasonably related" to clinical testing for FDA.
Later, after approving the Intermedics test applied by the District
Court, Judge Rader then noted that "§ 271(e)(1) simply does not
globally embrace all experimental activity that at some point,
18
however attenuated, may lead to an FDA approval process."'
Moreover, "[t]he safe harbor does not reach any exploratory research
9
that may rationally form a predicate for future FDA clinical tests.""
At the end of his opinion, Judge Rader revealed what may well
have been his greatest motivation for not wanting to extend the scope
of § 271(e)(1) to cover Merck's experimental activities which
involved the use of Integra's patented RGD peptides:
[S]uch an extension would not confine the scope of § 271(e)(1) to
de minimis encroachment on the rights of the patentee. For
example, expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the Scripps-Merck

117.
118.
119.

IntegraLifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 866.
Id. at867.
Id.
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activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees
owning biotechnology tool patents. After all, patented tools often
facilitate general research to identify candidate drugs, as well as
downstream safety-related experiments on those new drugs.
Because the downstream clinical testing for FDA approval falls
within the safe harbor, these patented tools would only supply
some commercial benefit to the inventor when applied to general
research. Thus, exaggerating § 271(e)(1) out of context would
swallow the whole benefit of the Patent Act for some categories of
biotechnological inventions. Needless to say, the 1984 Act was
meant to reverse the effects of Roche under limited circumstances,
not to defrive entire categories of inventions of patent
protection.
Judge Rader is correct that Merck's reliance on § 271 (e)(1) does
not fall within that section's historic and legislatively anticipated
framework, which stems from the needs of generic companies seeking
to make copycat drugs. Yet, at the same time, the Federal Circuit has
not followed its previously laid out broad analytical approach as to
the scope of § 271(e)(1), as driven primarily by the test set forth in the
Intermedics decision. 121 In this regard, one might criticize the Integra
v. Merck decision as not properly following the broad interpretive
approach generally laid down by Federal Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent. 122 As suggested earlier, the activities with a research tool,
as in the Integra v. Merck case, are much more closely related to the
development and submission of information to the FDA than the
123
activities that were exempted in the Intermedics v. Ventritex case.
Moreover, Judge Rader's reasoning is problematic since he
suggests that the FDA is only interested in the results from clinical
trial testing and not in information that is yielded about a drug at the
much more preliminary "drug hunting" stage. 24 As noted earlier, the
120. Id.
121.
For an extensive discussion of this broad reasoning, see Derzko, supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
122. Although Judge Rader reached the same ultimate decision as Judge Crabb in Infigen,
Inc. v. Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967 (W.D. Wis. 1999), about § 271(e)(1) not
exempting an entity's use of a research tool, he did not adopt the same reasoning as Judge
Crabb, namely, that there must be a "perfect product fit" between those patented inventions
covered by § 271(e)(1) and those that are subject to patent term extensions pursuant to § 156.
This aspect of Judge Rader's decision at least is in accordance with the Federal Circuit's
previous reasoning as to § 271(e)(1) in AbTox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 122 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir.
1997), discussed supra note 97, and Chartex International PLC v. M.D. PersonalProducts
Corp., 5 F.3d 1505 (Fed. Cir. 1993), discussed supranote 98.
123. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
124. IntegraLifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 866.
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content of a drug's product insert defines those aspects of a drug for
which the FDA will want to see experimental data. 25 This
information includes a description of a drug and its pharmacology and
toxicity. 126 Some of the information relevant to these subject areas
could be generated at very early stages in a drug product's
development in what might be termed the "drug hunting" stage, and
well before clinical testing for a drug begins. Therefore, this
characterization of the scope of § 271(e)(1) coverage seems incorrect.
In addition, Judge Rader's comment that the FDA is not
interested in the "hunt for drugs" nor about drugs other than the
compound for which an Investigational New Drug (IND) application
is submitted to the FDA 127 is problematic because it seems to suggest
the § 271(e)(1) may offer a greater scope of protection for drugs once
they become the subject of such an application to the FDA. This
leads to a highly uncertain situation for drug developers who simply
do not know until very late in the drug development stage whether a
drug's data will get submitted to the FDA for consideration in the
context of an IND application. A drug developer would want to know
at the outset of undertaking certain activities with a patented invention
whether or not they will be considered infringing activities. 128
On the other hand, the Court reached a valid position from a
policy perspective, if one examines what would have been the
consequences of exempting from infringement under § 271(e)(1) the
use of research tools to conduct FDA-required research. On this
level, it is important to recognize that when § 271(e)(1) is relied on by
generic pharmaceutical companies to conduct experiments with its
generic copy of a patented drug for FDA approval, the exclusive
patent rights on the "patented invention" or drug that is sought to be
copied are not entirely abrogated. That is, even if the experimental
use exception allows the generic company to undertake certain
activities with the patented invention/drug prior to patent expiration
without liability for infringement, the generic company will not be
able to sell the generic copy until after the patent expires and after it
obtains FDA approval for the copy. In the meantime, the owner of
the patented drug retains the exclusive right to sell the drug and reap
125. See supra notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text.
126. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56 (2003).
127. IntegraLifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 866.
128. It should be noted that Judge Newman explained in her dissent that one of the
compounds tested by Merck did, in fact, become the subject of an IND application in 1998. Id.
at 874. Given Judge Rader's reasoning, it is unclear whether he factored this fact into his
analysis of Merck's activities.
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profits from it while the patent remains in force. This is a much
different scenario from how the experimental use exception would
impact owners of patented research tools.
If the provision were to allow research entities conducting
biomedical research for FDA approval purposes to use the research
tools for free and be exempted from a charge of infringement under §
271(e)(1), then the patented research tool provider would not be able
to financially benefit from its patent monopoly vis-d-vis these entities.
129 So, in actual fact, the experimental use exception would
abrogate
the patentee's rights entirely vis-d-vis a patentee's large customer
group, namely, biomedical companies in the business of drug
development, including the right to sell or license its patented30
research tool to such companies, as alluded to by Judge Rader.!
This is rather different from just limiting the right to control one
aspect of the patented invention's many possible uses during the
patent term, where that use does not generally affect the company's
ability to earn revenue from that patented invention's (i.e., the drug's)
sales to consumers (i.e., patients). It is true, however, that any other
uses of research tools not within the context of research undertaken
for FDA approval would still be subject to the full brunt of the
patent's force, and would not be exempt from a charge of
infringement. 13 1 Depending on the percentage of potentially exempt
versus non-exempt uses as to a patented research tool, a patent's
exclusivity could be encroached upon to a greater or lesser degree.
Judge Newman's dissent included a consideration of the
common law research exemption, which the majority pointed out was
not an issue before the Court. 32 Consequently, Judge Newman's
comments, particularly her comment that "today the court
disapproves and essentially eliminates the common law research
129. For example, in footnote 4 of the Judge Rader's opinion in the Integra case, he refers
to a National Institutes of Health (NIH) definition of research tools as "tools that scientists use
in the laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such as PCR),
methods, laboratory equipment and machines." Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 872 n.4
(quoting Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of
NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed, Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1[Dec. 23, 1999]).
130. Integra Lifesciences I, 331 F.3d at 867.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 864 n.2. While the majority was strictly correct in noting that the common law
research exemption issue was not before the Court, Judge Newman explained that the matter
was before the District Court but that, at the Federal Circuit's oral hearing for this case, counsel
explained that the matter was not being addressed on appeal partially because of a recently
decided case, id. at 878, which we can assume to have been Madey discussed above, supra note
40 and accompanying text, and discussed in part I1of this article.
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exemption"' 33 are not entirely appropriate. On the other hand, given
our discussion in this paper, her comments are relevant and worth
examining.
Judge Newman argues that Merck's drug development
activities 34 are embraced either by the common law research
exemption or by the statutory exception at § 271(e)(l). 135 More
specifically, Judge Newman writes that Merck's initial basic research
was shielded by the common law research exemption and Merck's
36
subsequent development activities were shielded by § 271 (e)(1).1
As to the common law research exemption, Judge Newman
contends that:
The subject matter of patents may be studied in order to understand
it, or to improve upon it, or to find a new use for it, or to modify or
"design around" it. Were such research subject to prohibition by
the patentee the advancement of technology would stop, for the
first patentee in the field could bar not only patent-protected
competition, but all research that might lead to such competition,
as well as barring improvement or challenge or avoidance of
patented technology. Today's accelerated technological advance is
based in large part on knowledge of the details of patented
inventions and how they are made and used. Prohibition of

133. Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 873.
134. Although the majority never described Merck's relevant research activities involving
Integra's patented RGD peptides, Judge Newman included the following helpful description of
such activities:
The record describes modifications in the structure of RGD-containing peptides
and investigations of their properties in the Scripps/Merck collaboration,
including: receptor binding assays to investigate the efficacy and specificity of
structural change; angiogenesis/chick CAM assays for inhibition of blood vessel
formation in chick embryos when vessel growth is artificially induced, to study
the mechanism of action, pharmacokinetics, and other properties; angio-matrigel
experiments to investigate inhibition of artificially induced vascularization in
mice; cell adhesion assays by spectrophotometric measurement of inhibition of
cell attachment to protein, to provide information about mechanisms, efficacy,
and other properties; chemotaxis studies to determine the effect of various
peptides on cell migration over extracellular matrix fibers; use of chick embryos
to obtain pharmacokinetic data; fluorescent-activated cell sorting to study the
effect on the receptor-ligand binding reaction, to aid in understanding
mechanisms of activity; vascularization of the retina and induced arthritis of the
joints, studied with mice and rabbits; chick CAM assays to study angiogenesis
associated with tumor transplantation and growth in chick embryos; and tumor
growth in SCID-mice or nude mice, including studies of mechanism,
pharmacology, and pharmacokinetics.
Id. at 874.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 878.
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research into such knowledge
cannot be squared with the
37
framework of patent law.1
Furthermore, Judge Newman states that although she does not intend
her decision to set the "boundaries of the research exemption for all
purposes and all activities,"' 138 she does observe that "there is a
generally
recognized
distinction between
'research'
and
'development,' as a matter of scale, creativity, resource allocation,
and often the level of scientific/engineering skill needed for the
project,"'' 39 and notes that "this distinction may serve as a useful
divider" to decide what might be covered by the exemption. 40 At the
end of her discussion about the common law research exemption,
Judge Newman finds that:
[A]n ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful research
should not eliminate the exemption. The better rule is to recognize
the exemption for research conducted in order to understand or
improve upon or modify the patented subject matter, whatever the
ultimate goal. That is how the patent system has always worked:
the patent is infringed by and bars activity associated with
development and commercialization of infringing subject matter,
but the research itself is not prohibited, nor is comparison of the
patented subject matter with improved
technology or with designs
14
whose purpose is to avoid the patent. 1
Judge Newman's views on the common law research exemption
are similar to the broad notions of such an exemption delineated in
Janice Mueller's writing discussed earlier. 142 However, Judge
Newman adds the additional nuance that the applicability of the
research exemption should be dictated by whether an activity can be
denoted as a "research" or a "development" activity. 143 In practice,
defining the line between these two activities could prove difficult.
Consequently, the delineation between coverage of a research
exemption based on commercial versus non-commercial activities
seems to be a more practical approach. The amount of damages could
be used to reflect that the infringing party merely used a patented

137.
138.
139.

Id. at 875.
Id. at 876.
Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 876.

140.

Id.

141.

Id.

142.
143.

See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
Integra Lifesciences 1,331 F.3d at 876.
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invention in research, for example, while seeking to develop a better,
144
new product, and thus should not have to pay a high damage award.
After stating her views about the common law experimental use
exception, Judge Newman turned to a discussion of her view of the
scope of the "safe harbor" (or experimental use exception) in §
271(e)(1). Unlike the majority, she interpreted § 271(e)(1) to be
broader than simply applying to the activities of generic companies
seeking to develop copycat drugs. In addition, Judge Newman
expressed her further dissent from the majority's views on § 271(e)(1)
as follows:
The majority also holds that none of the research by Scripps/Merck
qualifies for § 271(e)(1) immunity because the research was
directed to "discovery," not to federal registration. I agree that
"the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor [does not] reach back down the chain
of experimentation to embrace development and identification of
new drugs." ... However, the territory that the Scripps/Merck
research traversed, from laboratory experimentation
to
development of data for submission to the FDA, was either exempt
exploratory research, or was immunized by § 271(e)(1). It would
be strange to create an intervening kind of limbo, between
exploratory research subject to exemption, and the FDA statutory
immunity, where the patent is infringed and the activity can be
prohibited. That would defeat the purposes of 1both
exemptions;
45
the law does not favor such an illogical outcome.
Judge Newman's argument is convincing, namely that an
"intervening limbo" between the coverage of infringement
exemptions should not exist. 46 However, it is premised on her view
of how broad the common law experimental use exception should be.
For reasons noted earlier, 147 her view of this exception may be too
broad.
144. Judge Rader mentioned de minimis damage awards for small infringing uses in
Embrex Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000), which might be
appropriate in such an instance. Interestingly, if we look to the matrix of exempted user
activities that should be available in a research exemption, see suprapart I1 of this article, Judge
Newman's position can be illustrated as additionally exempting activities that are marked in the
matrix as CI-D3 and C1-D4, and likely also CI-D2 and C2-D2. Nonetheless, Judge Newman's
view appears to be slightly narrower than Professor Mueller's view on the question of what the
scope of a research exemption should be, since earlier we found that Professor Mueller's notion
of a research exemption would encompass a "yes" in all squares in the matrix. See supra notes
37 & 38 and accompanying text.
145. Integra Lifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 877.
146. Id.
147. See discussion accompanying supranotes 142 & 143, and discussion in part II of this
article, text accompanying supranotes 36 & 37.
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At the end of her reasons, Judge Newman explained that, in her
view, the RGD-containing peptides claimed in the Integra patents
were not research tools but rather "new compositions having certain
biological properties."' 148 In her mind,
A research tool is a product or method whose purpose is use in the
conduct of research, whether the tool is an analytical balance, an
assay kit, a laser device (as in Madey v. Duke University), or a
biochemical method such as the PCR (polymerase chain reaction).
It is as subject to the patent right as is any other device or method,
whether it is used to conduct research or for any other purpose.
Use of an existing tool49 in one's research is quite different from
study of the tool itself.1
Thus, Judge Newman's definition of a research tool is what was
termed in Part I of this paper as a pure research tool. However, as
discussed in Part I, both pure and partial research tools exist and
should be considered as we study and attempt to solve the research
tools problem. Moreover, Judge Newman's viewpoint that Integra's
RGD peptides are not research tools does not coincide with the facts.
A likely utility of the RGD peptides was, either in part or entirely, for
use in the conduct of research. Consequently, only Judge Rader has
recognized the research tool nature of Integra's RGD peptides.
Yet Judge Newman speaks persuasively about the need to have
appropriate infringement exemptions in place to support and facilitate
research and development activities in our technology-based
economy. This is the case even though Judge Newman believes that a
broad common law research exemption should exist to protect
commercially-driven research activities. This is a broader view than
the one advocated in Part II of this paper. However, Judge Newman's
comments as to what a research tool might be, and the refusal to see
the RGD peptide as a research tool reflect much weaker reasoning.
Judge Newman's narrow views of what constitutes a research tool
(which are narrower, for example, than the NIH's views) reflect an
indifference on Judge Newman's part as to the consequences to patent
holders of establishing broad infringement exemptions. As such, her
comments provide no guidance as to how to actually strike the right
balance in the area of patented research tools between respecting
patent rights and providing appropriate research exemptions to
properly encourage innovation. Accordingly, what follows in the last

148.

IntegraLifesciences 1, 331 F.3d at 878.

149.

Id.
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section of this paper is a proposal on how to set the various legal
levers available in patent law to strike such a balance.
Given the weighty issues addressed in the Integra case, it will be
interesting to see whether the Federal Circuit will decide to reconsider
this case en banc.150 Although Judge Rader's decision has failed to
follow the extremely broad interpretation previously afforded to the
exempting coverage of § 271(e)(1), his position is based on a sound
policy concern of not entirely abrogating the patent rights of research
tool patent holders. 151 In this regard the Integra case could be
interpreted more broadly to mean that a statute setting forth an
exemption to a right cannot be so broadly interpreted that it entirely
removes the benefit of that right. At the same time, however, Judge
Newman raises equally weighty policy concerns on the opposite side
of the spectrum. What is clear from the Integra case at this stage is
that the Federal Circuit is not currently willing to endorse a broad
reading of § 271(e)(1) that would help address the patented research
tools problem. Of course, the Integra case may not be the end of this
line of cases. A different set of facts involving the use of a research
tool "higher up the chain" of drug research and closer to the point of
an investigational new drug (IND) submission may well lead to a
subsequent court decision (even under Judge Rader's analysis in
Integra) that § 271 (e)(1) exempts the use of such a research tool.
One way to prevent the spread of the § 271(e)(1) exemption into
exempting the use of research tools might be by legislative
amendment. Some guidance on how § 271(e)(1) could be amended
can be obtained by looking at German jurisprudence interpreting its
experimental use exception, which is called an "experimentation
privilege" and is found at section 11 No. 2 of the German Patent Act.
152
decision discusses the
The Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) HJ

150. See comments in supra note 101 as to the status and background of this situation.
151. Integra Lifesciences 1,331 F.3d at 867.
152. Klinische Versuche (Clinical Trials) II (Case X ZR 68/94), Federal Supreme Court of
Germany, BGHZ 135, 217, [1998] R.P.C. 423 translated in 1998 WL 1043174 (BGH[Ger])
(1998). In Clinical Trials II, the patent in suit claimed erythropoietin as a polypeptide having a
defined amino acid sequence obtained by means of genetic engineering. The defendant relied
on the German experimentation privilege and conducted clinical trials with samples containing
as the active agent a recombinant human erythropoietin extracted from the kidney cells of baby
hamsters. The clinical trials were intended to confirm the animal test results, and to supply the
necessary data to obtain official pharmaceutical permission to market the product. In particular,
the defendant sought to identify the relevant clinical differences in the effectiveness and
digestibility between its product and another product on the market. On appeal to the Federal
Supreme Court of Germany, the Court concluded that the defendant's activities were protected
by the experimentation privilege.
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German experimentation privilege. In the course of its reasoning, the
Federal Supreme Court of Germany noted the following as regards
section 11 No. 2 of the German Patent Act:
In order to limit the rather wide scope of the concept of
experiment, section 11 No. 2 of the Patent Act requires as the
scope of the exemption the determining operating fact that the
experiment must be related to the object of the patented invention.
It follows from this that the object of the invention must itself be
the object of the experimental activities for the purpose of
obtaining results.153 (Emphasis added).

If the U.S. experimental use exception in § 271(e)(1) were similarly
limited so that the object of the patented invention itself had to be the
object of the experimental activities, then the provision could not be
interpreted in such a way as to cover the use of patented research
tools in drug research and development, since the drug candidate
submitted to the FDA for approval and not the patented research tool
would generally be the object of the experimental activities.
To some, an endorsement from the Federal Circuit in the Integra
case that § 27 1(e)(1) shields a biomedical company's use of research
tools in the course of research generating data for submission to the
FDA would have been a positive development. This would have been
particularly the case for smaller biomedical companies who are more
heavily financially burdened by the licensing costs that they must pay
to use the research tools that are needed in their research and
development activities. Larger innovative pharmaceutical companies
could also have greatly benefited financially from such a decision
even though they may be feeling somewhat less of a financial burden
than small biomedical companies from all of the licensing costs on
the patented research tools that they use to conduct their research.
And the costs of using a patented research tool, such as Integra's
RGD peptides is not insubstantial. 154 For example, although the
Integra case was remanded to the District Court for a reevaluation of
the damages issues, the initial damages award against Merck that was
established by a jury was $15
million to compensate Integra for its
55
loss of a reasonable royalty! 1
On the other hand, as suggested earlier while examining Judge
Rader's decision, such an outcome in the Integra case would have
been highly problematic for the many biotechnology companies that
153.
154.
155.

Id.at*431.
IntegraLifesciences, 331 F.3d at 871.
Id.
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are mainly or exclusively in the business of developing,
manufacturing and selling research tools and thus rely on patent
protection to secure their investment and make their existence
feasible. By threatening such companies' abilities to enforce their
patent rights against commercial research tool patent users conducting
FDA-related research, an entire industry sector could be destroyed.
This, in turn, could lead to a drought as to new research tool
innovations. In the longer run, the lack of new research tool
innovations could negatively affect those biomedical companies
conducting pharmaceutical research that rely on such new tools to
conduct cutting-edge biomedical research. Such companies could be
prevented in the future from conducting such research in an efficient
manner because they are lacking the necessary research tools. This
in exploring new research frontiers, and
would slow our progress
15 6
discovering new drugs.
Consequently, contrary to Eisenberg's and Heller's views that
the "upstream" patenting of research tools is necessarily a bad thing
because such "upstream" patenting can block subsequent research, a
strong argument can be made that the existence of such patent
protection may actually encourage further technological development
by constantly providing researchers with new and better research
tools that can lead researchers to the new frontiers in research.
Without patent incentives, there likely would not be any extensive
development of new research tools. It would be useful if an empirical
study could be conducted to examine whether allowing patenting of
research tools actually encourages subsequent innovation because the
better quality research tools that are produced allow subsequent
research to be undertaken with greater rapidity and accuracy. Two
examples of patented high quality research tools are the PCR reaction
and microarray technology, both of which have revolutionized
biomedical research. Knockout mice also have introduced a useful
model by which to study disease and the effectiveness of a drug as a
treatment for a particular disease.157

"The biotech industry is establishing itself as the discovery arm of the pharmaceutical
156.
industry." JOrgen Drews, Drug Discovery: A HistoricalPerspective, 287 SCIENCE 1960, 1960
(2000). See also Kelly Longo of Global Strategic Alliances, Pfizer Global Research and
Development, Address at the Virginia Biotechnology Summit (Oct. 14, 2003), where the link
between these industries also was noted. See The 2003 Virginia Biotechnology Summit (Oct.
13-15, 2003), available at http://www.vabio.org/2003/summit-schedule_03.htm (last visited
Nov. 25, 2003).
Knockout mice, in particular, have been shown to have tremendous predictive power
157.
in identifying which drugs and drug targets will be successful:
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In any event, it is important to keep in context the extent to
which § 271(e)(1) could even offer a solution to the research tools
problem. In the second part of this paper, we considered a matrix of
patented research tool users and the uses for such tools that illustrates
in what categories of user and use the policy arguments are in favor of
finding a research exemption. This matrix is reproduced below.

D I(new product
development)
D2(designaround
development)
D3(research on
tool itself)

D4(tool in basic
research)

C1 (private
sector)
No - exception
should not be
available
No - exception
should not be
available
N/A - all
activities likely
business
oriented
N/A - all
activities likely
business
oriented

C2 (public
sector)
No - exception
should not be
available
No - exception
should not be
available
Yes - exception
should be
available

C3 (individuals)

Yes - exception
should be
available

Yes - exception
should be
available

No - exception
should not be
available
No - exception
should not be
available
Yes - exception
should be
available

As noted earlier, this matrix reflects the position that users
engaging in new product development or design-around development
with the tool (i.e., commercially-driven activities) should not be
After a decade of using mouse knockouts, the data on their predictive power in
drug discovery is irrefutable. The top 100 selling drugs in 2001 are directed only
to 29 drug targets, many with multiple agents addressing the same target. Of
these 29 targets, 23 have been knocked out and in every case the knockout mouse
was highly predictive as to the on-target effects and side effects of the associated
drugs.
Arthur T. Sands, Industrializing Breakthrough Discovery, CURRENT DRUG DISCOVERY, Aug.
2002, at 21. Sands indicates that this success will lead to a more efficient and cost-controlled
way to discover new drugs:
Since knockout mice have been shown to model drug activity, they provide an
unprecedented level of predictive power over the drug discovery process and can
be extremely valuable to the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. With
the effective use of mouse knockout technology, expensive drug discovery
activities such as high-throughput screening, medicinal chemistry, preclinical
research and clinical trials can be focused on the drug targets that are most likely
to lead to breakthrough therapeutics.
Id. at 23.
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protected by a research exemption, but non-commercial activities
involving research tools should be so protected.
Yet, given such a model for the scope of a research exemption, §
271(e)(1) would not be effective in providing such scope to the
exemption, even if the Integra case were decided in favor of Merck.
The coverage of § 271(e)(1) would only extend to the use of a
research tool in drug development (i.e., the Ci-DI box), where the
user most likely is from the private sector (since public sector entities
do not tend to be in the business of seeking FDA drug approval).
Consequently, § 271(e)(1) could address only a small subset of all of
the valid uses for research tools that one might think of, namely, one
out of twelve such possible uses. Section 271(e)(1) could not, for
example, offer a solution in a Madey-type problem (assuming it to be
in a biomedical context) where a public sector institution wishes to
engage in research on the tool itself to understand better how it works
or wishes to use the tool to conduct basic research. Therefore, even if
Rader found research tool use in the course of FDA-related research
to be exempt from patent infringement in Integra, under § 271(e)(1),
this could not offer a "complete" solution to the research tool
problem.
IV. A PROPOSED

SOLUTION FOR ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS

ARISING FROM PATENTS ON BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOLS.

The "anticommons" problem with research tools is a serious
science policy issue that warrants attention and a solution that will
optimize innovation incentives. This part provides a proposal on how
to set the various legal levers available in patent law to achieve such a
solution. Optimizing innovation incentives is the key to improving a
society's well-being by allowing society to access new and better
58
products, particularly in the biomedical or drug development area.'
Given the acknowledged importance of patents as innovation
incentives for members of the biotechnology industry' 59 who are at
158. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 878 (1990).
159. For example, in an essay by Rebecca Henderson, Luigi Orsenigo, and Gary P. Pisano,
it is noted "that the lack of adequate patent protection was a major obstacle to the development
of the biotechnology industry in Europe." Rebecca Henderson et al., The Pharmaceutical
Industry and the Revolution in Molecular Biology: InteractionsAmong Scientific, Institutional,
and Organizational Change, in SOURCES OF INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP: STUDIES OF SEVEN

INDUSTRIES 267, 302 (D.C. Mowery & R.R. Nelson eds., 1999). This is an empirical indication
that patents provide important innovation incentives in the biotechnology industry. Moreover:
In the fields of chemical products and pharmaceuticals, intellectual property
rights have tended to be strong since the turn of the 20th century, and this has

2004]

PATENTING BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH TOOLS

38S

the root of biomedical research tool development, any solution that
optimizes innovation incentives should respect the rights of research
tool patent holders (i.e., research tool providers). 60 This includes
making sure that research tool providers are sufficiently compensated
for their research and development efforts on research tools, and are
able to earn a reasonable amount from the tools that they have created
and patented. After all, if we as a society want our biomedical
researchers to be able to continue to discover new and better drug
products, then such researchers will need new and better research
tools to assist them, and someone will need to pay research tool
providers for the research and development costs of such tools.
However, at the same time, it is important to have in place some kind
of a research exemption that will not completely abrogate the rights of
research tool providers but will nonetheless allow certain worthy
research projects involving research tools to be undertaken without
the research tool user having to pay royalties or face the threat of a
patent infringement suit. Finally, for those research and development
activities that do not end up being covered by a research exemption, it
is important to have some way to control the size of royalty payments
that are paid out for licences to use research tools such that the
financial burden imposed by license fees does not get so oppressive
that valuable research and development projects are halted or their
progress slowed down.

enhanced the ability of firms to capture the returns to their R&D. However, these
industries tend to be unusual in the extent to which they depend on intellectual
property rights in order to profit from their innovations ....
David C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson, Explaining Industrial Leadership, in SOURCES OF
INDUSTRIAL LEADERSHIP: STUDIES OF SEVEN INDUSTRIES 359, 380 (D.C. Mowery & R.R.

Nelson eds., 1999). As well, Merges and Nelson describe the same phenomenon within the
chemical industry, a subset of which is the pharmaceutical industry. Merges & Nelson, supra
note 159, at 897-98. These industries are related to the biotechnology industry.
160. In this paper, the assumption is that the research tool patents that exist are validly
issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. This, of course, is the first line of defense in
preventing "anticommons" problems from developing (i.e., preventing upstream patent rights
from blocking downstream research and development activities). For example, one of the
examples that Eisenberg and Heller turned to when describing their "anticommons" concept
were expressed sequence tags (ESTs). The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) has taken

steps to clarify what type of scrutiny should be afforded to patent claims on gene fragments by
adopting both written description guidelines, United States Patent and Trademark Office,
Revised Interim Written Description Guidelines Training Materials & Revised Interim Utility
Guidelines Training Materials, at http://www.uspto.gov (last visited Aug. 11, 2003). By

granting patents only on those inventions involving gene fragments that are new, useful, nonobvious, and appropriately defined and described, there should be less concern that an

"anticommons" of inappropriate patents might get created in an area.
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A legislative solution is urgently needed to address situations in
which defined users may use patented research tools pursuant to a
research exemption. The matrix provides those categories for which
such a legislative solution should be available. 61 Essentially, public
sector research entities (e.g., universities) and individuals should be
protected by such a legislatively-established research exemption when
they wish to study a research tool to better understand how it works,
and also when using a research tool in the course of basic research.
Both pure and partial research tools (as defined in part I) should be
covered by this limited exception.
A legislatively-established
solution should be provided in such circumstances because little
money is available amongst the noted user groups to pay for licensing
fees, and yet these non-profit research activities should be
encouraged. In other words, the situation contemplated in Madey
(albeit in the biomedical context) should be protected by a research
exemption.
This research exemption, however, should not necessarily be so
broad as to allow public sector research tool users to be able to get
research tools from research tool providers for free. If users wish to
have such tools in a ready-made format (as seen, for example, in
research tool catalogs available from research tool providers), then
such users should still be expected pay a fee for such tools, so long as
the price is reasonable. Thus, we need to take into consideration the
non-profit status of the user. On the other hand, if the public sector
user decides to make the patented research tool on its own for use in
its own research activities, then it should not face a patent
infringement lawsuit.
The harder question is which, if any, commercially-driven
activities using patented research tools should be protected. Prof.
Mueller has suggested that a research exemption should be available
to even cover commercially-oriented activities where the research
entity is trying to develop a design-around of a patented invention
(e.g., such as a research tool) or is using a research tool in the course
of trying to develop a new product. 62 While such activities are
perhaps worthy of being protected by a research exemption, since
they are likely to yield another useful commercial product, it seems
only fair that the commercial user of the tool pay a reasonable price
for using it. This price should not be excessive (i.e., it should be de
minimis), and it should reflect only the amount of use that the user
161.

See supra Part 11.

162.

See supra text accompanying note 36.
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engaged in to develop the new product or design around. In any
event, given the previously-identified competing policy concerns that
a broad research exemption might completely destroy the value of
research tool patents, it is appropriate to draw the line between
exempted and non-exempted activities based on what are commercial
and non-commercial activities.
An additional wrinkle in this problem is when a public sector
entity, such as a university, ends up acting like a commercial entity,
for example, by seeking to enforce biomedical patent rights that it
might have, or by partnering with a private sector entity in developing
a new commercial product or a commercial design-around to an
existing research tool (i.e., thus falling within the C2-D1 and C2-D2
boxes of the research exemption matrix discussed previously). This is
by no means an uncommon occurrence ever since the Bayh-Dole Act
was passed in 1980:
As publicly-supported institutions of higher learning, universities
have a longstanding mission to foster research and the
dissemination of new knowledge. Since 1980, the Bayh-Dole Act
has directed universities to take on the further mission of
promoting commercial development of the discoveries that they
make with federal funds. In furtherance of this new mission,
federal law encourages universities to patent their discoveries and
to license them to firms in the private sector. Many universities
have established technology transfer offices to market the
discoveries of their scientists in accordance with the Bayh-Dole
Act. 163
Because of the Bayh-Dole Act, the bright lines between
commercial and non-commercial research are blurred. 164 Whereas the
Bayh-Dole Act does not make it more likely that a private sector
entity (e.g., a company) would be engaged in non-commercial
research, it does make it more likely that a public sector entity (e.g., a
university) would be engaged in commercial research.
In view of the Bayh-Dole Act, if a university undertakes the use
of a research tool in a project with commercial overtones, the
legislatively established research exemption should not be available.

163.

National Institutes of Health, supra note 12. For more information on the Bayh-Dole

Act, 35 U.S.C. § 207(a) (2000), see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private
Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-SponsoredResearch, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1663 (1996). See also David C. Mowery, et al., The Growth of Patentingand Licensing by
U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author).
164.

See generally National Institutes of Health, supra note 1I.
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An example of a commercial motive by the university would be if the
university used a research tool in the course of research which led to a
patent directed to a design-around of the research tool or a new
product. It seems only fair that if a university is seeking patent rights
and trying to gain revenue from the existence of the patent in a certain
subject area, then that university must also be willing to respect
research tool patents,165and thus pay a reasonable amount for using such
patented inventions.

As noted at the beginning of this part, the research tools problem
must be addressed by respecting research tool patents and establishing
a limited legislative research exemption. Further, it is important to
have some way to control the size of royalty payments that are paid
out for licenses to use research tools, in the context of those research
and development activities that do not end up being covered by such a
research exemption. This last feature of a proposed solution to the
research tools problem should be done ideally by eliminating reachthrough license agreements (RTLAs) and ensuring that the royalties
that are otherwise charged by patented research tool providers are not
unreasonable. 166
165. Richard Nelson presents a proposal of Rochelle Dreyfus for a research exemption in
slightly modified form that similarly limits the exemptions' applicability:
Of the several proposals for a research exemption that have circulated recently, I
find one of the most interesting to be that put forth by Rochelle Dreyfuss (2002).
In what follows, I amend slightly. Under the proposal a university or non-profit
research organization (under one version of her proposal, any research
organization) would be immune from prosecution for using patented materials in
research if 1) those materials were not available on reasonable terms (this is my
amendment), and 2) if the university or other research organization agreed not to
patent anything that came out of the research, (or if they did patent to allow use
on a nonexclusive royalty free basis-my amendment).
Richard Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons (Aug. 11, 2003) RES. POL'Y
(manuscript accepted for publication and on file with the author).
166. Interestingly, in her article, Professor Mueller proposes a different approach to
solving the research tools problem which relies on the use of reach-through royalty schemes
rather than eliminating them. Mueller, supra note 36, at 59. In taking this position, she finds
support in the writing of John Barton who argues that reach-through royalties are not per se
improper. Id. at 59 n.290. Mueller summarizes her solution in her conclusion as follows:
A potential solution is a "liability rule" model that permits the non-consensual
"development use" of research tools not readily available for licensing or
purchase, while providing an ex post royalty payment to the patent owner that
would be correlated to the commercial value of the new product developed from
the non-consensual use. This "reach-through" royalty approach provides the best
approximation of the true worth of the research tool to its user. It ensures a
royalty award of sufficient amount to maintain incentives for the development
and patenting of new research tools, yet alleviates the access restrictions and upfront costs currently associated with acquisition and use of many proprietary
research tools.
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The RTLA is problematic because it imposes a tax of unknown
magnitude on future biomedical research products such as
pharmaceuticals. 1 67 Consequently, it would be helpful to be able to
develop a legal basis upon which to find that RTLAs on research tool
patents are unenforceable. One route might be to find that RTLAs
constitute patent misuse.
The doctrine of patent misuse arose from the Supreme Court's
decision in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 68 where the Court
found that "respondent [was] making use of its patent monopoly to
restrain competition in the marketing of unpatented articles, salt
tablets, for use with the patented machines, and [was] aiding in the
creation of a limited monopoly in the tablets not within that granted
by the patent. 1 69 Accordingly, the Court found that "a patent affords
no immunity for a monopoly not within the grant .... [A]nd the use
of it to suppress competition in the sale of an unpatented article may
deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity to restrain an
alleged infringement by one who is a competitor. ' 70 Thus, to
determine whether an RTLA on a research tool might constitute
patent misuse, we must ask whether an RTLA on a patented research
tool is a means by which the patent owner of the research tool
improperly extends the scope of the patent monopoly on the tool. A
clear answer to this question is not available since the existing case
law on patent misuse is not right on point.
One place to look for guidance is Mallinckcrodt, Inc. v.
Medipart, Inc.' 71 which examined the doctrine of patent misuse in the
context of the doctrine of patent exhaustion, also known as the first
sale doctrine. Generally, the patent exhaustion doctrine states that
Id. at 66. However, if one were to adopt Professor Mueller's approach, this would not solve the
problem of research tools. While the approach may facilitate immediate access to research tools
by biomedical researchers, stacking royalty obligations on the products of the research will still
exist, and what is worse, such royalties will have to be paid at an unknown later date and in
unknown amounts. An excessive amount of such future payment obligations could quickly
discourage a biomedical company's investors from continuing to invest in it even if the drug
products that the company was anticipated to develop appeared promising. This, in turn, could
lead to abandoned biomedical research projects which would only exacerbate the research tools
problem. Moreover, Mueller's approach is akin to a compulsory licensing scheme which is
contrary to traditional U.S. patent law principles. See infra notes 226-229 and accompanying
text.
167. For a discussion of RTLAs, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text. The
notion of a tax is developed infra.
168. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
169. Id. at 491.
170.

Id.

171.

976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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"one who buys patented article[s] of manufacture from one authorized
to sell them becomes possessed of an absolute property in such
articles, unrestricted in time or place."' 172 Perhaps a more helpful
statement of this doctrine is as follows:
[A]s between the owner of a patent, on the one side, and a
purchaser of an article made under the patent, on the other, the
payment of a royalty once, or, what is the same thing, the purchase
of the article from one authorized by the patentee to sell' it,
emancipates such article from any further subjection to the patent
throughout the entire life of the patent, even if the latter should be
by law subsequently extended beyond the term existing at the time
of the sale, and that, in respect of the time of enjoyment, by those
decisions the right of the purchaser, his assigns or legal
representatives, is clearly established to be entirel' free from any
further claim of the patentee or any assignee ....
This description of the doctrine of patent exhaustion suggests
that, if there is a sale for a fee of a patented research tool, then the
holder of the research tool patent cannot, for example, seek an
additional payment from the purchaser of a final research product that
either contains the patented research tool or is manufactured based on
information obtained from a research tool. However, what if the
patented research tool was not sold outright but rather its use was
licensed?
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc. 174 may provide some
guidance on this point also. This was a patent infringement and
inducement to infringe case which related to the use of a patented
medical device in violation of a "single use only" notice that
accompanied the sale of the device.1 75 Medipart argued, based on the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, that the "single use only" notice was a
restriction that constituted patent misuse since "no restriction is
enforceable under patent law upon a purchaser of a sold article."' 7 6 In
the decision, the Federal Circuit discussed certain early cases dealing
with domestic patent exhaustion. 177 In deciding whether or not
Mallinckrodt's actions constituted patent misuse, the Court reasoned
that "[t]he appropriate criterion is whether Mallinckrodt's restriction
is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the patentee has
172.

Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 666 (1895).

173.

Id.

174.

Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 700.

175.
176.

Id.
Id. at 703 (emphasis in original).

177.

Id. at 704-08.
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ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior having an
anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of reason."' 78 The
Federal Circuit held that restrictions on the sale of a patented item
may be acceptable even if it was the first sale since it was a sale with
' 79
notice of the restriction that the device was for "Single Use Only."'
Accordingly, "[t]he restriction here at issue [did] notper se violate the
80
doctrine of patent misuse or the antitrust law.'
The Federal Circuit conveniently summarized its important
Mallinckrodt holding in B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott
Laboratories:
[In Mallinckrodt], we canvassed precedent conceming the legality
of restrictions placed upon the post-sale use of patented goods. As
a general matter, we explained that an unconditional sale of a
patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control the
purchaser's use of the device thereafter ....The theory behind this
rule is that in such a transaction, the patentee has bargained for,
and received, an amount equal to the full value of the goods
(citations omitted). This exhaustion doctrine, however, does not
apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such a
transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated
a price that reflects only the value of the "use" rights conferred by
the patentee. As a result, express conditions accompanying the
sale or license of a patented product are generally upheld ....
Such express conditions, however, are contractual in nature and are
subject to antitrust, patent, contract, and any other applicable law,
as well as equitable considerations such as patent misuse ....
Accordingly, conditions that violate some law or equitable
consideration are unenforceable. On the other hand, violation of
valid conditions entitles the patentee to a remedy for either patent
infringement or breach of contract ....This, then, is the general
framework.
In Mallinckrodt, we also outlined the framework for evaluating
whether an express condition on the post-sale use of a patented
product constitutes patent misuse. The patent misuse doctrine,
born from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, is a method of
limiting abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws.
The key inquiry under this fact-intensive doctrine is whether, by
imposing the condition, the patentee has "impermissibly broadened
the 'physical or temporal scope' of the patent grant with

178.
179.
180.

Id.at 708.
Id. at 702, 709.
Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 701.
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anticompetitive effect," (citation omitted).... Two common
examples of such impermissible broadening are using a patent
which enjoys market power in the relevant market, see 35 U.S.C. §
271(d)(5) (1994), to restrain competition in an unpatented product
or employing the patent beyond its 17-year term. In contrast, field
of use restrictions .. are generally upheld, (citation omitted), and
any anticompetitive effects they may cause are 81
reviewed in
accordance with the rule of reason (citation omitted). 1
The case of RTLAs is not directly analogous to the situation
contemplated by Mallinckrodt and the patent exhaustion doctrine
(also known as the first sale doctrine). Mallinckrodt teaches us that it
is acceptable to license the use of a research tool for a fee and with
express conditions. However, can the license be granted on the
condition that a postponed fee will have to be paid based on potential
future sales of a research product generated using the tool, rather than
only having to pay a fee for the use of the tool per se? One might
argue that a logical extension of the first sale doctrine is that it is only
fair to charge the user of a patented technology a royalty based on the
number of times that the user uses the technology, rather than on an
extraneous and unknown factor, such as the sales of a downstream
research product that results from using the upstream research tool.
An exclusive or nonexclusive license on future discoveries as a
payment for the use of the research tool would be similarly
inappropriate by this analysis. The problem with charging deferred
royalties based on the sales of a downstream research product is that
the purchasers of the downstream research product become directly
saddled with the costs of the research tool since each unit of research
product sold likely will be priced with these future royalties in mind.
Thus, this cost is akin to a tax on the final research product that the
purchaser of the product effectively pays. One of the problems with
this analysis is that, arguably, Mallinckrodt suggests that the first sale
doctrine is not applicable since the user of the research tool had notice
of the reach-through royalty scheme. While this may be true, the
research tool user likely would not have known the magnitude of the
total royalty payment since the downstream research product would
not have been created at the time that the RTLA was negotiated.
Another argument that RTLAs constitute patent misuse might
stem from an analogy based on Brulotte v. Thys Co., 182 a case in
181.
124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
182. 379 U.S. 29 (1964). Although the Brulotte precedent finding post-expiration royalties
to be per se unenforceable has recently been challenged by Judge Posner in Scheiber v. Dolby
Laboratories, Inc., 293 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1109 (2003), the
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which the Supreme Court considered whether the respondent misused
its hop-picking machine patents by extending the term of its patent
licenses beyond the expiration dates of the patents. The Court
concluded "that the use by a patentee of royalty agreements that
' 83
project beyond the expiration date of the patent is unlawful per se."'
Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas reasoned that:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can
negotiate with the leverage of that monopoly. But to use that
leverage to project those royalty payments beyond the life of the
patent is analogous to an effort to enlarge the monopoly of the
patent by tieing the sale or use of the patented article to the
purchase or use of unpatented ones.]84
A relevant fact underpinning the Court's decision in Brulotte
was that the licenses in question did not differentiate between
royalties to be paid during the pre- and post-patent expiration periods.
In Aronson v. Quick PointPencil Co., 85 the applicant set up a license
agreement with the respondent for the keyholders on which the
applicant had filed a patent application.' 8 6 The respondent agreed to
pay a royalty rate of 5% for the exclusive right to make and sell the
keyholders, with the stipulation that if the applicant's patent
application was not allowed within five years, the royalty would be
reduced to 2.5% for as long as respondent continued to sell the
keyholders.187 The Court held that the royalty agreement here was
lawful and enforceable since, unlike Brulotte, this was not a situation
where a patent monopoly was misused by negotiating with the
leverage of that monopoly. 188 The Supreme Court stated: "Here the
reduced royalty which is challenged, far from being negotiated 'with
on the contingency that no patent
the leverage' of a patent, rested
' 89
years."'
five
within
issue
would

Supreme Court of the United States declined to grant certiorari in the Scheiber case in order to
reconsider its ruling in Brulotte. Accordingly, Brulotte remains the governing law on the
question of post-expiration royalties. For a discussion of this issue, see Michael P. Sandonato &
Howard D. Shatz,

N.Y.L.J.,
Reassess
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Will Supreme Court Accept Invitation on Post-Expiration Royalties?,

Dec. 2, 2002, at 4; and Daniel L. Reisner & David K. Barr, High Court Declines to
"Brulotte,' N.Y.L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at 4.
Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. at 32.
Id. at 33.
440 U.S. 257 (1979).
Id. at 259.
Id. at 260.
Id. at 265.

Id.
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Based on Brulotte, it might be argued that RTLAs unlawfully
extend the period during which royalties must be paid beyond the
term of the patents as to which user rights are being licensed. Such an
extension could occur if the patent to which the RTLA pertains
expires before the sales of a downstream research product occur and
royalties become due. This might occur in situations where royalties
end up being imposed on downstream research products more than
twenty years from the date of filing the patent. If the RTLA has the
same royalty rates before and after patent expiration, then Aronson
would not be applicable. However, a court might find that it is not
appropriate to analogize to Brulotte and Aronson if the postponed
royalty payments are the only consideration provided by the licensee
for the right to use the research tool protected by the RTLA.
None of the patent misuse cases discussed here lead us directly
to the conclusion that RTLAs are a form of patent misuse. And yet,
since the concept of an RTLA seems to inappropriately expand the
monopoly rights on a patented research tool beyond the scope of the
patent itself, it seems reasonable to argue that RTLAs can be a form
of patent misuse. Ultimately, since patent misuse is a "fact-intensive
doctrine,"' 90 courts will end up considering each RTLA on a case-bycase basis to determine whether it is fair and equitable. 1 9'
Even if the patent misuse doctrine fails to provide the basis upon
which to find RTLAs unenforceable, a research tool user might argue
that a RTLA involving the research tool is unenforceable because the
RTLA charges an unreasonable royalty. In fact, this argument also
could be made in the context of regular royalty payments on patented
research tools that might be excessive. A benchmark case that
elucidates various factors that should be considered in evaluating
what is a reasonable royalty is Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. US.
Plywood-Champion Papers Inc. 192
The Court in that case
contemplated a hypothetical license negotiation framework for
determining a reasonable royalty to be imposed on a defendant/patent

190. See supra text accompanying note 18 1.
191.
While a case-by-case approach to determining the enforceability of RTLAs might be
acceptable for large, private sector research tool users who can afford litigation, it is problematic
for smaller research tool users who cannot afford such litigation. For such a smaller research
tool user, a legislative solution that deems RTLAs unenforceable may be most helpful.
192. 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D. N.Y. 1970). This case has been cited extensively as the case
that enumerates the factors to be considered to determine what is a reasonable royalty. See, e.g.,
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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infringer.' 93 In this hypothetical negotiation framework, the court
indicated that a reasonable royalty is:
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a
license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty
and yet be able to make reasonableprofit and which amount would

have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to
grant a license.
(Emphasis added.)
This framework contemplates that a reasonable royalty is one
that the licensee could pay and still be able to make a reasonable
profit.195 Therefore, this test could be applied to scrutinize any type
of royalty payment being made on a research tool. However, it is
important to consider that a research tool user might need to be able
to make a reasonable profit after having used several research tools
and paid several such royalties. Additionally, in determining what
amounts to a reasonable royalty, the fact that a research tool provider
should be able to earn a reasonable profit from the royalties in order
to cover the provider's research and development costs also should be
factored into this analysis.
Moreover, a strong argument can be made that an RTLA that
imposes royalty payment obligations not based on the actual use of a
research tool but rather based on the sales of a future product is
unreasonable, since there is uncertainty as to the magnitude of the
royalty and further uncertainty as to whether the royalty will allow the
research tool user to make a reasonable future profit on the sale of the
future product. One way to eliminate RTLAs from the biomedical
research tool patent domain is by legislative amendment. For
example, 35 U.S.C. § 284, which defines what constitutes a
reasonable royalty, might be amended to indicate
that royalty
96
payments made pursuant to RTLAs are unreasonable.1

193. Georgia-PacificCorp., 318 F. Supp. at 1121.
194. Id.
at 1120.
195. Id.
196. The relevant portion of 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) states: "Upon finding for the claimant
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in
no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer,
together with interest and costs as fixed by the court."
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Yet even if a legislative amendment to the meaning of what
constitutes a reasonable royalty is not passed, it should be possible to
convince a court to render unenforceable a RTLA granting
authorization to use a patented research tool in return for a payment of
unknown magnitude based on the sales of an unknown future product
that may be developed. Judicial skepticism toward "use" royalties on
end products is evident. For example, in Foster v. American Machine
& Foundry Co., 197 the patentee, Foster, had a patent directed to a
welding improvement, and the defendant manufactured welding
machinery that included this improvement. 198 The defendant then
sold or leased its welding machinery to mill producers who produced
longitudinally welded tubes and pipes.1 99 The defendant was found to
infringe Foster's patent, and the district court awarded a reasonable
royalty "for a license to [the defendant] to continue its manufacture
and sale of the equipment and for a license to [the defendant's]
customers to use the equipment." 200 However, the patentee felt that it
was owed a royalty based on the "extent of use of [the Foster]
'welding system' by the mill operatorswho leased the welding
equipment
containing
the
infringing
[component]
from
'0
[defendants]. ' The Court rejected this notion, finding no "history
evidencing willingness by the mill operators to pay a running, or
throughput royalty, based on their production, for rights to the
welding process. 20 2 This case is not directly analogous to the one
that generally might exist with RTLAs on biomedical research tools,
since, in the research tools situation, both the user of the patented
research tool in research and the seller of the ultimate product
developed with help from the research tool might be one and the same
person. In the Foster case, the defendant who made the infringing
welding machine, and the mill operator who used the machine to
make the final product (i.e., welded tubes and pipes) were two
separate entities. 20 3 On the other hand, the Foster case indicates
reluctance on the part of a court to impose a reasonable royalty based
on the sales of a product (i.e., the welded tubes and pipes) developed
by using a machine that incorporates the patented product. In the
research tool scenario, the final product might be a drug that is
197.

492 F.2d 1317 (2nd Cir. 1974).

198.

Id. at 1319.

199.

Id. at 1320.

200.

Id.

201.

Id.

202.

Id. at1321.

203.

Foster,492 F.2d at 1320.
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developed as a result of an extensive research protocol that includes
the use of the patented research tool.
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc.20 4 is another case that illustrates the
judiciary's skepticism toward "use" royalties on end products, and is
more analogous to the situation that exists with RTLAs on biomedical
research tools. In that case, the patentee had a number of patents
directed to methods and machines for making taco shells, which the
defendant used to make taco shells. 20 5 The district court awarded
damages in the amount of $1.485 million based on a "reasonable
royalty" of 4.2% on the defendant's sales price for taco shells.20 6 The
Federal Circuit held that this damage award was clearly erroneous and
should have been based on a lump-sum for each machine rather on the
defendant's production of tacos. 20 7 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court noted that:
Since there is no evidence that users in the food industry upon
purchase of food processing equipment also expect to pay a use
royalty (whether based on a separate method patent or on the right
to control use of patented machines), a willing licensor could not
have reasonabl expected to secure a use royalty from either the
maker or user.
Of course, if a user of a patented research tool that was subject to
an RTLA sought to rely on the Stickle case, a patented research tool
provider might argue that the case is distinguishable because there is
evidence (for example, the presence of an industry practice) that
RTLAs are entered into for the use of biomedical research tools.
However, if such an argument were made, challenging evidence could
be provided of the general discontent in the industry with such
RTLAs, and efforts to resist such RTLAs. For example, as noted
earlier, the biomedical research industry was successful in resisting a
RTLA on patented PCR technology that Cetus Corporation had tried
209
to impose.
Moreover, the NIH Research Tools Guidelines
expressly indicate that it is inappropriate for recipients of NIH

204.

716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

205.

Id. at 1553.

206.

Id.

207.

Id. at 1563.

208.
209.

Id. at 1562.
See discussion supra Part I.

402

SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 20

research grants and contracts to enter into
RTLAs when they seek
210
licenses to use biomedical research tools.
If we could eradicate reach-through licence agreements from the
research tools landscape, then a major cause of the "anticommons" in
the biotechnological research tools industry would be eliminated.
However, as Heller and Eisenberg noted, "too many concurrent
fragments of intellectual property rights in potential future products"
can also create an anticommons in this area.2 ' While Heller and
Eisenberg mentioned patent applications on expressed sequence tags
(ESTs) as an example of this problem (which we considered earlier in
this section),21 2 any large bundle of research tools for which licenses
might be required to be obtained to conduct biomedical research
could also lead to the same problem. Consequently, even if RTLAs
were eliminated, the biomedical research community may still carry a
substantial licensing "tax" on its future research and development
endeavors. It would be helpful if there were some way in which a
biomedical research entity could amass the necessary research tools
licenses at a lesser cost to be able to pursue a desired course of
research.
A solution to the problem would be to create a patent pool that
might encompass the necessary patents to conduct biomedical
research and could be licensed to a research entity. Carl Shapiro
examines how these business arrangements might operate-mostly in
the computer software and electronics industries-to dissolve the
"anticommons" in those areas.213
However, creating business
arrangements of this kind that do not run afoul of the antitrust laws is
not easy. Patent pools are acceptable, from an antitrust perspective, if
"blocking" or "essential" patents are placed in the pool but
21 4
unacceptable if "substitute" or "rival" patents are in the pool.
"Blocking" is described as follows in the "Antitrust Guidelines for the
Licensing of Intellectual Property:"

210.

Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research and Grants on Obtaining

and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,094

(Dec. 23, 1999).
211.
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 700.
212.

See supra notes 24, 159 and accompanying text.

213.

Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and

Standard-Setting (Mar. 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of California,
Berkeley), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPCOO-01 1. Shapiro speaks of a
"patent thicket" to describe the "anticommons" problem.
214.

ld. at 17.
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Sometimes the use of one item of intellectual property requires
access to another. An item of intellectual property "blocks"
another when the second cannot be practiced without using the
first. For example, an improvement on a patented machine can be
blocked by the patent on the machine. Licensing may promote the
development
of technologies that are in a blocking
coordinated 21
5
relationship.
These Guidelines also make the following comment on pooling
arrangements:
Pooling arrangements generally need not be open to all who would
like to join. However, exclusion from cross-licensing and pooling
arrangements among parties that collectively possess market power
may, under some circumstances, harm competition .... In general,
exclusion from a pooling or cross-licensing arrangement among
competing technologies is unlikely to have anticompetitive effects
unless (1) excluded firms cannot effectively compete in the
relevant market for the good incorporating the licensed
technologies and (2) the pool participants collectively possess
market power in the relevant market. If these circumstances exist,
the Agencies will evaluate whether the arrangement's limitations
on participation are reasonably related to the efficient development
and exploitation of the pooled technologies and will assess the net
effect of those limitations in the relevant market ....
Another possible anticompetitive effect of pooling arrangements
may occur if the arrangement deters or discourages participants
from engaging in research and development, thus retarding
innovation. For example, a pooling arrangement that requires
members to grant licenses to each other for current and future
technology at minimal cost may reduce the incentives of its
members to engage in research and development because members
of the pool have to share their successful research and development
and each of the members can free ride on the accomplishments of
other pool members .... However, such an arrangement can have
procompetitive benefits, for example, by exploiting economies of
scale and integrating complementary capabilities of the pool
members, (including the clearing of blocking positions), and is
likely to cause competitive problems only when the arrangement
includes a large fraction of the potential research and development
in an innovation market.216
215.

U.S. Dept. of Justice & U.S. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Guidelines for the

Licensing of Intellectual Property § 2.3 (Apr. 6, 1995), availableat

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ipguide.htm.
216. Id. § 5.5, at 28-29.
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Consequently, if the biomedical community were able to
organize a number of blocking research tool patents into a patent pool
which could be freely licensed to any interested research entity, then
this may be an approach for overcoming the research tools problem
that also would be acceptable to the antitrust authorities. Such a
patent pool could be organized through a trade organization. Of
course, the challenge would be to identify blocking research tool
patents and get the owners of such patents to agree to license them in
a pool. Perhaps if other options for commercializing their inventions
were blocked because they were found to be unlawful (e.g., if RTLAs
were found to constitute patent misuse), then this would fuel
sufficient interest among research tool patent holders to come
together and create a patent pool.
However, Heller and Eisenberg have suggested in their article
that "a patent anticommons could prove more intractable in
biomedical research than in other settings" 2 17 because cooperation, for
example in the form of a patent pool, among members of the research
tools industry may be difficult. They argue that this may be the case
"[b]ecause patents matter more to the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries than to other industries."2 18 While it may be
true that each individual pharmaceutical or biotechnology patent is
more valuable, generally speaking, than individual patents in other
industries, no doubt a combination of patents, for example in the
2 19
computer software or electronics industries, also could be valuable.
Nonetheless, members in such industries have successfully created
patent pools encompassing such patents.220 It also is worth noting that
the pooling of intellectual property rights is very common in the
copyright area, where this is done, for example, with the rights of
copyright owners to written works or music. 22' Such arrangements
217.

Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 700.

218.

Id.

219.

This is certainly the case, for example, with the commercially important laser patents.

See Karl Jorda, The Thirty-Year LaserPatent War, 43 IDEA 545, 545 (2003).
220.
See, e.g. Shaprio, supra note 213, at 17-18. For example, Shapiro mentions the
Department of Justice-approved patent pool on MPEG-2 video compression technology which

encompasses patents from Fujitsu, General Instrument, Lucent, Matsushita, Philips, ScientificAtlantis, Sony and Columbia University. Id. Another approved patent pool that Shapiro
mentions is the patent pool covering digital versatile disk (i.e., DVD) technology that
encompasses patents of Philips, Sony and Pioneer. Id. Apparently, Philips, Sony and Pioneer

jointly license their patents that are necessary to make discs and players that comply with the
DVD-Video and DVD-ROM standards. Id.
221.
The American Society of Composers, Authors

and Publishers (ASCAP) and

Broadcast Music Incorporate (BMI) are two collective rights organizations that fulfill this role.
For more information on these organizations, see Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability
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can provide guidance as to how to efficiently administer and enforce a
patent pool of research tool patents.222 Thus, it should not be taken as
a foregone conclusion that an anticommons in the biomedical
research tools area will prove intractable as Heller and Eisenberg
suggest.
If a particular patented research tool were of central importance
to the biomedical industry but was being licensed at an exorbitant
royalty rate or by way of a RTLA, or not at all, one way that such a
research tool might be made accessible at a reasonable price to those
seeking to use it in subsequent innovation efforts would be by a
government patent buyout mechanism. For example, the patents for
PCR technology would be attractive selections for a government
buyout because PCR technology is of central importance to the
biomedical community. Another such technology is the knockout
mouse. 2 2 3 Michael Kremer describes his notion of a government
patent buyout as follows:
Under the mechanism, the market value of patents would be
determined through a sealed-bid second-price auction, and the
government would then offer to buy patents at this private value
times some constant markup which would reflect the typical ratio
of social to private value. Most of the patents that the government
bought would be placed in the public domain. However, in order
to give auction participants an incentive to reveal their true
valuations, a small proportion of patents, chosen randomly, would
would have the right to
be sold to the high bidder. Patent holders
2 24
accept or reject the government's offer.
Once the government obtained control of the patent, the
invention could be made widely available at a reasonable price. The
National Institutes of Health (NIH) or a different governmental/public
entity might be charged with the task of getting the invention into the
public forum. Establishing such a patent buyout mechanism likely
will entail some costs. However, these costs may well be worth
incurring to forego the costs that may be associated with RTLAs,
including the royalty costs as well as opportunity costs of research
and development projects that did not proceed due to the inability to
Rules: IntellectualProperty Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293,
1328 (1996).

222.

Id.

See supra note 157 for more information regarding the importance of knockout mice
223.
to current and future drug discovery methodologies.
Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for EncouragingInnovation, 113 Q.J.
224.
ECON. 1137, 1146 (1998).
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pay such royalties. If a patent buyout mechanism were used to solve
the research tools problem, it would be important that any nongovernment "high bidder" that obtains the patent be obligated to make
the patented research tool available to the public on reasonable terms
prior to the auction taking place. A neutral trade organization or the
auction participants themselves might be called upon to define what
constitutes "reasonable terms" for the licensing of a patented
technology. The rule, however, would be that the royalty rate would
have to be lower than what the patentee offers, perhaps in return for a
tax break, and the non-government "high bidder" that obtains the
patent would not be allowed to enter into any RTLAs involving the
patented research tool.
The multi-faceted solution discussed here stems from the
user/provider model of patented biomedical research tool activity that
was introduced in Part I of this paper. However, the focus of that
model to date has been on parts C and D of the model, namely the
users of research tools and their potential uses of those tools.
Underlying this focus is an assumption that we are dealing generally
with research tool providers denoted in the B.2 category, namely
those that seek to license and make money directly from their
research tools, since these are the providers that would be willing to
provide research tools to users.
However, those research tool
providers that refuse to license their research tools because they see
this position as being advantageous (i.e., in the B.1 category) should
also be considered. As to this second group of providers, and the
research tools that they have developed, those users whose research
with research tools ends up being protected by a research exemption,
as proposed in Part IV of this article, would be able to make and use
such research tools freely for the limited purposes described.
However, other research tool users who might wish to use such
research tools would have little recourse under existing U.S. patent
law which does not have a doctrine of compulsory licensing that
might require the providers to license their patented research tools.
While this may seem unfair, two things should be noted. First,
the user who wishes to use such a tool could create a design-around
and use a different and perhaps better tool in his or her own
subsequent research. As discussed previously, 225 such a use of the
patented research tool to create the design-around would amount to an
infringement; however, a court should only impose minimal damages
on the user given the circumstances.
Moreover, once having
225.

See, e.g., Judge Rader's comments to this effect, supra note 52.
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developed a design-around, the user may then have greater leverage
to negotiate a license, (e.g., in the form of a cross-license) to allow
use of the provider's patented research tool. Second, the user will
eventually be able to use the invention once the patent on the research
tool expires. In some ways, this may be a better situation than the
user would have been in had the provider decided to maintain the
research tool invention as a trade secret, since such a monopoly on an
idea is not limited in time so long as it is kept secret. (On the other
hand, in the trade secret scenario, a user who independently develops
the research tool would be able to use it freely, unlike in the patent
scenario.)
Ultimately, from a society's perspective, if there is truly a
situation where a provider does not wish to license a research tool, it
is likely because the provider is anticipating developing a better
invention with the tool (e.g., a new drug or a better research tool) that
the provider does intend to share with society by selling or licensing
it. The provider may have calculated that maintaining exclusivity
over the tool is critical to providing sufficient incentives to move
ahead with research as to the better invention. Consequently, society
will benefit from the tool's existence, albeit indirectly. Moreover, if
such an invention is not forthcoming, simple economic thinking
suggests that a profit-maximizing actor (as all research tool providers
might be expected to be) would be willing to license their patented
research tool if there was a demand for the tool. This then would
bring the originally "refusing" research tool provider back into the
fold of the mainstream analysis in this article.
An outstanding consideration, however, is whether U.S. patent
law should be amended to require compulsory licensing of biomedical
research tools to resolve the situation discussed in which a research
tool provider refuses to license his tools or only at an exorbitant price.
The argument in favor of imposing a compulsory licensing scheme on
biomedical research tool inventions is that society will benefit more
from the patented biomedical research tool if it were licensed to
numerous users who might all then use it in their research and
compete in the search for a drug. For example, Mueller proposes what
is essentially a compulsory licensing scheme, i.e., a "liability rule"
model that would permit the non-consensual 'development use' of
patented research tools that are not readily available for licensing or
purchase, while providing an ex post royalty payment to the owner of
the patented research tool of sufficient amount to maintain adequate
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incentive for innovation in new tools. ' 22 6 Such a system, Mueller
suggests, would be particularly helpful "where significant transaction
costs are associated with accessing the patented research tools
necessary to develop downstream application products such as new
drugs, therapies, and diagnostics. '227 A quantitative analysis would
be beneficial to evaluate the extent to which "refusing research tool
providers" exist, and to evaluate whether compulsory licensing
actually fosters greater innovation.', 228 Robert Merges, for example,
has engaged in an analysis that "counsels against compulsory
licensing as a way to reduce transaction costs" and advocates "that
privately established Collective Rights Organizations (e.g., patent
pools as mentioned in this article) will often emerge to break the
transactional bottleneck., 229 Ultimately, any compulsory licensing
scheme should be adopted with caution since the notion of
compulsory licensing runs counter to traditional principles underlying
U.S. patent law, and may end up having a negative effect on the
licensing of biomedical research 23tool
patents in the long run and the
0
future development of such tools.
V. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we first developed an understanding of what a
research tool might be. To better conceptualize the research tools
problem and propose a solution for it, we developed a simple model
of patented research tool activity. Second, we examined the research
tools problem, namely, that patenting of research tools may be
creating an "anticommons" that may be hindering subsequent
innovation because undertaking such innovation is too costly. In this
context, we traced the demise of the common law experimental use
exception to understand the negative impact of these developments on
the research tools problem.
Third, we considered how the
experimental use exception found at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), on its
face, might shield from infringement a researcher's use of a patented
research tool during a course of research undertaken to produce a
pharmaceutical end product that will require FDA approval.
226.

Mueller, supra note 36, at 54-55.

227.

Id. at 9.

228.

Merges, supra note 221, at 1295.

229.

Id.

230.
For more information on compulsory licensing generally, see M.J. ADELMAN ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 1235-36 (1998); ROBERT PATRICK MERGES, PATENT
LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 993 (2d ed. 1992). See also Merges, supra note 221,
at 1296-97.
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Additionally, we discussed the Merck case, in which the Federal
Circuit decided that § 271(e)(1) did not extend this far.
Although many players in the biomedical community would
welcome the ability to use research tools for free in the course of
research under some form of infringement exemption, research tool
manufacturers might suffer a potentially fatal blow if such
exemptions became too widespread, irrespective of whether the
exemption were to be pursuant to § 271(e)(1) or otherwise.
Moreover, a weakened research tool manufacturing industry could
have a long-term negative impact on future biomedical innovation
since the stream of improved research tools may cease. This is
because improved research tools are often what allow biomedical
researchers to learn more about biological systems and thus push the
innovation frontier outward.
In the last section, this paper proposes a compromising,
innovation-optimizing solution to the research tools problem. This
solution includes a limited research exemption for public sector (e.g.,
university), non-commercial research in which a researcher engages
in research with a tool or seeks to better understand how the tool itself
works. Beyond this, since RTLAs can create a potentially large
financial burden of unknown magnitude on downstream research
products, it would be best to eliminate RTLAs from the research tools
landscape, either by legislative amendment or by finding a legal
doctrine by which RTLAs might be found to be unenforceable. For
example, one might argue that RTLAs lead to unreasonable royalties.
The patent misuse doctrine might also be relied upon in this instance.
Principles of what constitutes a reasonable royalty also should be kept
in mind to keep non-RTLA-type royalties under control as well.
Finally, to reduce the costs of using needed research tools in
biomedical research, we consider the possibilities by which the
biomedical industry might organize itself to create patent pools that
contain some of the essential research tool patents for licensing to
research entities. If a handful of patents is particularly crucial to
future biomedical research, the government might be able to purchase
such patents in a patent buyout auction and make the patents available
to research entities under reasonable terms. All of these steps should
be taken before resorting to a compulsory licensing scheme to render
patented research tools, that are hard to access due to high transaction
costs associated with such access or due to a provider's unwillingness
to license, more accessible. Compulsory licensing schemes are
contrary to transactional principles underlying U.S. patent law and
may provide less effective outcomes in the long run. Of course, the
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first line of defense against creating an anticommons caused by a
proliferation of research tool patents is to ensure that the PTO is
granting valid patents on research tools only after carefully
scrutinizing the claims sought to be patented.

